









# IDEALISM IN THEOLOGY

## A REVIEW

OF

DR. WARD'S SCHEME OF DOGMATIC AUTHORITY.

BY

H. I. D. RYDER,

OF THE ORATORY.

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LONDON:

LONGMANS, GREEN, READER, AND DYER.

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## PREFACE.

I THINK it right to say a word by way of explanation to those of my fellow-Catholics, who, whether they agree or not with the theological views I am expressing, may be inclined to deprecate my publishing so strong a criticism upon a perfectly orthodox and true-hearted Catholic like Dr. Ward.

Such criticism, they may say, is calculated to give Protestants the notion that we are really divided one against the other, and they are sure to make the most of it against us.

Now I am far from ignoring the force of this objection, and I have only set it aside upon the deliberate conviction that an indefinitely greater scandal, not only to Protestants but to Catholics, arises from the idea that Dr. Ward's writings express the one legitimate view amongst loyal Catholics. As it is, inquiring Protestants are disgusted and thrown back, and many thoughtful Catholics are puzzled and depressed, by, what I must call, the tyranny of lay journalism.

As to Dr. Ward himself, I cannot but think that any thing in the shape of open criticism will be welcome to him. It is what he has demanded—nay,

challenged, more than once since the publication of his "Essays from the Dublin Review." I can only wish that he had chanced upon a more worthy antagonist.

I submit what I have said, without reserve, to the authority of Holy Church, trusting that, even where I may have unwittingly advocated error, I shall at least indirectly serve the cause of truth, by giving occasion for its fuller and more convincing vindication.

In conclusion, I can assure Dr. Ward that I have not been guilty of any intentional discourtesy to him; and that, where I have failed—as I am but too conscious has sometimes been the case—"to carve him as a dish fit for the gods," it has been from lack of skill, not of intention.

If I had not thought my task better done imperfectly than not done at all, I should certainly never have undertaken it.

THE ORATORY, BIRMINGHAM,

*March, 1867.*

## IDEALISM IN THEOLOGY.

It is notorious that in some minds the craving for ideal completeness is so strong as to overpower from time to time their sense of truth, and under the influence of this craving, without any conscious dishonesty, they are unable to read either in the past or present world of experience any thing but what, according to their preconceived notions, should be. Such minds, as we might expect, have a strong instinctive dislike for historical studies, and when, by the accident of controversy or otherwise, historical questions are thrust upon them, the chances are they will sacrifice fact to theory rather than theory to fact. At all costs their theory must be preserved in all the precision of outline with which they first transcribed it; thus they are excessively impatient of such outlying facts as with their proverbial stubbornness do not yield readily to their manipulation. An uncertain outline, an indication of a *terra incognita*, concerning which much may be probably conjectured, little certainly known, irritates them beyond measure. Like reckless geographers, they dash in, with a firm hand, promontories and bays, which, often inconsistent with the conclusions of science, are any how in a region undefined by the latest explorer. This is true of such theorists generally, whatever be the nature of their subject matter, but it is particularly true of religious theorists.

Of course, however it may be with others, the religious theory of Catholics is none of their own making. It is delivered to them with a sanction which precludes all discussion of its substantial articles. Still there are a great number of outlying truths which contribute, more or less, to form the tenets—taking the word, in its widest sense, to include

probable beliefs—of Catholics. It is into this field of probable religious truth that a Catholic theorist, of the stamp I have mentioned, will extend the theory he has grounded upon the particular aspect of revealed truth which recommends itself to him; and upon this revealed basis he will endeavour to graft, by a sort of feverish logic, as the necessary complements of revelation, the opinions which he conceives the completeness of his theory requires. Thus it is that worthy and able men have before now come unhesitatingly to assert that the Pope, as such, must necessarily be preserved from mortal sin:—this privilege being in their minds a strictly logical deduction from the promise, “Thou art Peter.” In vain history recounts the moral delinquencies of Popes; these must all perforce be explained away in behalf of their darling theory. Such men would be horrified at the notion that they were yielding in this to a spirit of rationalism; they imagine, on the contrary, theirs to be the very opposite spirit: and so in a certain sense it is; for they start on a revealed basis, which the thorough rationalist has formally rejected, and they would ground their last conclusion upon authority rather than on reason. Still for all that, theirs is a true rationalism, inasmuch as they set aside the testimony of God, as manifested in the world of present and past experience, in deference to a purely ideal standard of their own. The Catholic theorist has indeed accepted the body of Catholic doctrine as revealed by God; but as his mind begins to act upon it, his native love of completeness impels him to extend certain points of his belief beyond the warranty of the Divine revelation, not considering that, carried away by his love of systematizing, he has entered the region of probable truth, whither that warranty does not accompany him<sup>1</sup>. With him, to use the words of a great writer, “Logic blunders on through thick darkness and ethereal mediums.” Such a theorist pre-eminently has Dr. Ward shown himself to be in his religious writings generally, and especially in his recent volume upon Papal pronouncements.

Few of Dr. Ward’s readers will need to be reminded of the strong admiration he has expressed in more places than one

<sup>1</sup> Of course this process is in itself perfectly legitimate, if only the distinction between *certain* and *probable* truth be preserved.



for the writings of Mr. Mill<sup>2</sup>. The thoroughness and completeness of that philosopher's system seems to have an irresistible charm for him. If he were not a Catholic, we cannot but suppose that he would be a disciple of Mr. Mill; nay, putting aside the influence of Divine grace, if the coherency of Dr. Ward's theory were to receive any authoritative unloosening, we might dread the same result. Whilst fully recognizing that Dr. Ward's personal character gives every security against such sceptical reaction in his own case, I cannot but feel that the danger is a real one for many who have been tempted to stake their all on the tenability of his extreme view of Ecclesiastical infallibility.

It doubtless sounds paradoxical to liken the uncompromising champion of authority to the prophet of pure reason, but I think the resemblance will prove both real and instructive.

Mr. Mill is, by taste, not so much a metaphysician, as a political, or, what the Germans would call, a life philosopher. Disliking abstractions, using his great powers of analysis as a universal solvent, sifting away, as worthless, every thing traditional, ignoring every where the indefinite, he presents us with a theory of life, which is neither more nor less than a highly subtle and comprehensive utilitarianism. His metaphysic can hardly be called the parent of his politics, it rather stands in the relation to it that the fire does to the crop, for which it prepares the ground. With him body is a bundle of sensations, mind a sheaf of thoughts, which themselves are but transformed sensations, and thus the way is cleared for practical utilitarianism.

Dr. Ward, on his side, with due respect be it spoken, is not so much a theologian as a theopolitician; he cares little for theology, as such, has no appreciation for its silent spaces, which, like the starless gaps in the firmament, are so eloquent of One whose "ways are not as our ways, nor his thoughts as our thoughts;" and on the other hand, according to him, intellectual excellence has no part in man's perfection. Thus his one resource is to embrace unhesitatingly the most probable, i.e., the most telling, the most effective scheme of

<sup>2</sup> An admiration which it is amusing to see reciprocated by Mr. Mill in a footnote to his "Critique on Sir W. Hamilton."

authority, the best calculated to beat down this wretched wild world into subjection, and this he draws out to its extremest consequences.

His process, although with great parade of logic, is, I conceive, any thing but strictly logical. Nothing comes amiss for an argument that carries with it the slightest shadow of likelihood. Instead of the calm argumentation of the theologian, you find the eager petty pleading of the barrister: and how does he present his system when completed? as a probable hypothesis? nay, but as a certainty—"vires acquirit eundo"—which if you are a Catholic, at least a good Catholic, you must accept. It is certain, because it is the best. As Mr. Mill's philosophy is a material utilitarianism, so is Mr. Ward's theology a spiritual utilitarianism. It is not that this or that opinion is true, because sanctioned by Divine authority, but, because it recommends itself to him as the best moral discipline, and as most satisfactorily supplying a moral want.

Another point of resemblance between the two writers is their common rationalism, as evidenced in Mr. Mill by his contempt for the traditions of the human race, as embodied in first principles<sup>3</sup>; in Dr. Ward by his aversion for Ecclesiastical history, as hampering, or defining Ecclesiastical authority. Moreover the very extravagance of their opposition is a sort of tie between them. Each is a justification, and perhaps the best justification of the other. Mr. Mill would seem to say;—"If I might not carry my reason to the utmost, I would submit to be the slave of authority; I have no heart to bargain for a *rationabile obsequium*;" whilst Dr. Ward would vindicate his extravagant system of authority, by suggesting the rationalism of Mr. Mill as the terrible alternative its rejection would involve.

They are enemies, but less each of the other, than both of all moderate men. At the opposite poles of thought, they conceive themselves to be the only honest reasoners, all between are knaves or fools. Starting with the same premisses, each

<sup>3</sup> Witness his recent attack on Sir W. Hamilton, which has had the success that often attends a pirate with clean decks in an engagement with a rich but ill-stowed merchantman.

would arrive at the same conclusion. Though in opposite camps, their interests do not immediately clash. They can afford to be civil to one another, even as the encastled garrison and beleaguering army of mediæval warfare have often combined to disturb the peace of the citizens, whom one hated and both despised. When all beside are out of the way, then, and not till then, will one endeavour to convert or destroy the other.

To go back to the past, it is surely confirmatory of all this, that Dr. Ward in his review of Mill's *Logic*, in the "British Critic" for October, 1843, has made his exceedingly laudatory critique the platform for an apology for the general character of his own writings. In that review he denounces in very eloquent language, with which it is impossible not to sympathize, those timorous anti-theorists who, whenever a man attempts to carry out a religious principle fairly, charge him with propounding "rash and unguarded statements," with being "a wild theorist, a dangerous and objectionable speculator." I fully agree with Dr. Ward, that "not to systematize at all, is not to philosophize at all." My quarrel with him is, not that he theorizes, but, that he is the victim of a theory,—not that he carries out a principle fairly, but that he neglects to view it in the light of other collateral principles, as true and as important. He is welcome to theorize, but it is intolerable that, whilst theorizing, he should also dogmatize. When concerned with authority, if he cannot be content with enunciating what it teaches, and must indulge his imagination with the consideration of what his ideal requires that it should teach, he should at any rate be careful not to present the result as an integral part of its teaching. We have surely a right to demand that he should distinguish between the requirements of his own ideal and the requirements of the Church.

The work by which Dr. Ward is best known to the world is his book on "The Ideal of a Christian Church." I am far from wishing to undervalue its merits. It doubtless did good service in its day, in suggesting to many minds that the Catholic Church is the Church of Christ, if Church of Christ there be; but it is impossible to shut one's eyes to the danger of its unmodified insistence on the cogency of the *à priori* argument, from what *should be*, or rather from our notion of



what should be, to what *is*, especially where God's dealings with His creatures are concerned. Dr. Ward's Idealism mercifully brought him into the Catholic Church, but it was by the special disposition of Almighty God, and in spite of its natural tendency that it did so. "The Lord spake to the fish, and it vomited out Jonas upon the dry land." By a like providence Dr. Ward was cast upon the safe shore of the Catholic Church, instead of dropping, with so many of the victims of idealism, into "the vast and wandering grave" of hopeless scepticism.

If we turn to Chapter II. of the "Ideal," we shall find Dr. Ward committing himself to such statements as these: after speaking of the miseries physical and moral in factories, mines, workshops, &c., he says (p. 31), "To discuss how an Ideal Church would comport herself, if co-existing with such tremendous evils, involves the same sort of difficulty which Aristotle notes as to the parallel inquiry, in what manner would a perfectly virtuous man repent. A perfectly virtuous man would have done nothing to repent of; and in like manner a perfectly virtuous Church *could not* have co-existed with such tremendous evils." (P. 32.) "Let us suppose, however, an Ideal Church to be suddenly placed in charge with a country in which such a state of things had been allowed to grow up unchecked. . . . How careful at once her inquiry, What may be those branches of labour in which, whether from the kind or the amount of toil, the leading of a Christian life would be impossible? and how stern the prohibition, enforced by all spiritual sanction, against any of her children engaging in those branches." (P. 35.) "For dangers such as these (i. e. resulting from the reading of the heathen classics) an Ideal Church—whilst allowing such reading—will have devised with pains and sagacity deep and efficacious remedies."

(Pp. 35, 36.) The same Ideal Church, to meet the dangers arising from "new modes of philosophy, deeper views of history, fresh discoveries, and a higher criticism in philology," "displays an antagonistic literature and philosophy of her own; and for such schools of thought as are without her pale, she calmly and soberly surveys them; absorbing from them into herself such high and important principles as they may have introduced; so disentangling them from error, and



uniting them with other truths as to lead them forward to more legitimate inferences, and thus using them to display the treasure committed to her charge, in new and ever varying light, and to increase it by new acquisitions and results." Dr. Ward goes on to apply this in the immediately ensuing pages particularly to Biblical criticism, physical and metaphysical science, and the philosophy of history. He says, (p. 39), "In an Ideal Church there would exist a *recognized* theory, explaining fully the principles on which, and the degree in which the Christian can apply himself to the processes of experimental philosophy, with the hope of a true result."

Now I fully allow that there is a great deal of truth in all this, which may fairly tell, against the Anglican, in favour of the Catholic Church; but I maintain that it is a great and dangerous extravagance, to apply without careful explanation and modification, for the explosion of error, tests which truth herself cannot sustain.

What must we say of the French Church for some time previous to the Revolution? Is it so certain that it did not co-exist with evils, moral and physical, as great as those we endure in the England of to-day? And as for the dealings of the Ideal Church with modern philosophy and science, is not the reproach of inertness against the Catholic Church in this matter, a common excuse with those who fall away from her? Has she felt it incumbent upon her to make any approach towards giving us an orthodox geology, or philosophy of history, or a Catholic theory of government? Is it not impolitic, to say the least of it, to apply tests to others which we cannot stand ourselves? and is there not a certain irreverence, however unintentional on Dr. Ward's part, in prescribing the way God should deal with his creatures? It is only fair to Dr. Ward to say that (p. 11) he admits that his ideal cannot be perfectly realized: and here I must notice, as a speciality of our author, that continually, when engaged in advocating a particularly exaggerated view, he inserts a prudential salvo, in the shape of an admission, in three words, that he does not mean to deny this or ignore that; an admission which, if allowed to qualify his general treatment of his subject, would make him lose in rhetorical effect what he would gain in accuracy

of statement. Unfortunately, having thus relieved his conscience by an aside, he is able to fling himself without further scruple into the current of his choice; hence arises the well-nigh impossibility of doing justice at once to all his theological positions, and to the real *ἡθος* and rhetorical conclusion of his writings.

I should have had some scruple in criticizing what Dr. Ward wrote before he was a Catholic, had he not given evidence in his recent essays, that his idealistic tendencies are as strong as ever. I think his book on the Ideal of a Christian Church gives the key-note, as it were, to all his subsequent writings on religious subjects. In that book he told us what he thought the Church ought to do, and it can hardly surprise us that he should subsequently endeavour to show that the Church has in reality followed the course he prescribed to her. He has, of course, found his ideal, to a great extent, in the Catholic Church; but he is not contented to receive the Church as she is, encompassed with infirmity, a divine virtue in earthen vessels; he insists, that as she ought to meet, so she does in fact meet, all the requirements of his ideal. Where it is possible to suppose that she may be speaking infallibly, there she certainly does so speak. Where her pronouncements indirectly refer to science or philosophy, there she is delivering what must be henceforward recognized as the one orthodox theory on the subject; for is she not the mistress and teacher of the nations?

Before proceeding to criticize Dr. Ward's recently published volume of essays<sup>4</sup>, I must say a few words as to the character of the work I would undertake. The task is by no means an easy one, for this, among other reasons: these essays are the work of a theological writer who is conscious that, for the most part, he is addressing non-theologians, whom it behoves him both to instruct and edify; hence the curious medley that much of the writing presents, of argument and exhortation; marked by the constant recurrence in a train of argument of such phrases as—a Catholic of ordinary humility will be

<sup>4</sup> "The Authority of Doctrinal Decisions, which are not Definitions of Faith."  
—Reprinted from the "Dublin Review," 1866.

anxious to do this—will shrink from such a course, &c. Thus, a sort of animal heat, if I may use the expression, is given to an argument; which prevents its legitimate force being fairly tested. The fulness, the fleshiness, so to speak, of Dr. Ward's method is, so far, an argument against its accuracy; for a theological treatment, if fair, will not supply more than an anatomical sketch, a skeleton of Christian duty. The hortatory character of his style will doubtless account in a great measure, for even a stronger view of Papal infallibility being accredited to him than he fairly deserves. Thus he is popularly supposed to hold the infallibility of the Pope's *obiter dicta*, in spite of his own explicit denials of such doctrine in the volume before us. The general effect of his essays, their rhetorical conclusion, is an exaggeration of his theological position. In dealing with his volume I should wish to do justice both to the one and the other.

I propose to examine Dr. Ward's view, 1st., As to the value of the doctrinal instructions of Papal encyclicals, as such.

2nd. As to the connexion of the infallible utterances of the Church with the depositum.

3rd. As to the import and value of the censures attached to propositions.

4th. As to the alleged difficulties of the Galileo case.

I trust to be able to show that the spirit of the great theologians, even where they do not in express terms condemn Dr. Ward's theological position, is wholly different from the arbitrary and extravagant temper which mars so seriously the usefulness of his present volume.

As must be the case with almost all Mr. Ward's Catholic readers in this country, I have ever conceived myself to be an Ultramontane. Gallicans, as a party, have pretty well disappeared, although no doubt the principle still exists; but you may not unfrequently hear the name *Gallican* or *moderate* applied to the older and more undemonstrative of the Clergy, both here and on the continent. With Gallicanism, in its original idea of national resistance to the authority of the Universal Church as represented by Christ's Vicar, God forbid that I should have the slightest sympathy; but in the modern



sense in which it is sometimes used, as expressing that uncourtierlike spirit, which is ever more on the alert to resist the enemy without, than to flatter the authorities within, which is indefinitely more appreciative of that outer-wall separating the Holy City from its besiegers, than of the little party-walls of private opinion betwixt brethren, it has my reverence and esteem. In this sense, and in this alone, I should like to think myself and the mass of my fellow-Catholics Gallicans. It should ever be borne in mind that there is no necessary coincidence between a moderate and a lukewarm Catholic: Sir Thomas More died for what may fairly be called a low view of Papal authority; and I have reason to know that the first, and for some time the only, ecclesiastic in France who refused to take the anti-Papal professorial oaths to which the most violent Ultramontanes had subscribed, was one who has long lived, and is likely to die, under the reproach of Gallicanism.

I cannot forbear quoting here Dr. Ward's eloquent vindication of the term "moderate," now become a popular term of religious abuse. There is something irresistibly amusing in his claiming the title for *himself*. ("Review of Mill's Logic," p. 353.) "The very name 'moderate,' that sacred word, is profaned in modern controversies. It is refused to those who realize any one principle, though they may be anxious to take the most favourable view of all human beings, to make allowance for their circumstances, to sympathize with their difficulties; it is granted to persons who may defend positions not held by ten persons besides themselves in the whole world, (so only that those positions result in seeming to establish the absolute perfection of our present system,) and who can never allude to their opponents after any other fashion than that of characterizing them as fit subjects for Bedlam or the gallows." I can only say that, if it be true, that the world thus strangely awards the title of *moderate*, she cannot, with any pretence to consistency, refuse it to Dr. Ward.

If Dr. Ward, because I fall short of the peculiar type of orthodoxy he presents to me, should brand me, as he does prospectively in his book, with the crime of disloyalty to the Holy Father, or only suffers me to escape in the ignominious company of confessed heretics by the back door of invincible ignorance, I would shelter myself under the authority of

Melchior Canus, no Gallican certainly, whose words (vid. De Locis. Theol. lib. i. p. 171. Resp. ad 4<sup>m</sup>.) I earnestly recommend to Dr. Ward's attention.—“Nunc illud breviter dici potest, qui summi Pontificis omne de re quâcunque judicium temerè ac sine delectu defendunt, hos sedis Apostolicæ auctoritatem labefactare, non fovere; evertere, non firmare. . . . Quid tandem adversus hæreticos disputando ille proficiet, quem viderunt non judicio, sed affectu, patrocinium auctoritatis Pontificiæ suscipere, nec id agere, ut, disputationis suæ vi, lucem ac veritatem eliciat, sed ut se ad alterius sensum voluntatemque convertat? Non eget Petrus mendacio nostro, nostrâ adulatione non eget.”

## I.

Dr. Ward's thesis, as we gather it from his Preface, is as follows:—The Pope speaks *ex cathedrâ*, or infallibly, so as to demand interior assent, not only in his definitions of faith (i. e. when he so teaches a doctrine as to pronounce its contradictory heretical), and when he condemns certain propositions as theologically unsound; but also in all the “*doctrinal instructions*” contained in various official addresses, such as allocutions, encyclicals, and the like—though not in all the “*dicta*,” because these last may often be “*obiter dicta*.” Further, the Pope in many of his official letters addressed formally to individual Bishops, also speaks *ex cathedrâ* and infallibly.

The first part of the thesis, which affirms the Pope's infallibility in all definitions of faith, (with the proviso for the sake of Gallicans,) of course all Catholics admit. The second part I shall consider later on, when dealing with condemned propositions. The last part, Dr. Ward's peculiar increment to the received opinion, which claims infallibility for all the “*doctrinal instructions*” of all encyclicals, and of many official letters not encyclic, I cannot but think new, unauthorized, and fruitful of much mischief. I am not denying that there are sometimes real definitions of faith in encyclicals; but these are infallible, and demand our interior assent, not simply in virtue of their being in encyclicals, but because they *are* definitions of faith. Of course I allow that all encyclicals and official letters

of the Pope, since they go so far to engage the Church to the particular line they take, must be in a special manner under the guidance of the Holy Spirit, who is pledged to preserve the Church from all errors of faith and morals, and all such errors of discipline as would militate against her life. The mere fact that the Holy Father is speaking, is sufficient to secure, from all good Catholics, respect and obedience. We cannot doubt but that the general course of his instructions is holy and true, in a sense that no other instruction is; nay, it is probable that sometimes he is speaking under the influence of the Spirit of Truth himself: but all this is widely different from saying that, where the Pope has not selected any particular proposition for his formal sanction or censure, our absolute interior assent is definitely demanded to what may appear to us the main propositions of a Pontifical document.

I presume Dr. Ward's distinction between the "*doctrinal instructions*" and the "*obiter dicta*" must turn entirely on the Pope's intention, which the case supposes not to have been formally expressed; it must be gathered then from the nature of the controversy, or the state of parties which has elicited the document in question. It may be the controversy has arrived at a high degree of precision, and Catholics are at issue on some definite point of doctrine. In this case we might have supposed that even an informal decision would have had the definiteness requisite for infallibility. Mauro Capellari, however, in his work "*Il Triomfo della Santa Sedia*"—subsequently, as Gregory XVI., the author of the "*Mirari Vos*" (see Appendix, note D)—particularly warns us against considering that even the circumstance of the contending parties demanding an infallible pronouncement on a point of doctrine, and the Pope apparently acceding to them (Dr. Ward's main argument for the infallibility of the "*Mirari Vos*") is a sufficient ground for presuming the pronouncement infallible, when the Pope does not use the prescribed formulas, or at least sufficiently express that, in spite of his omission of them, he is nevertheless speaking as Sovereign Pontiff and *Judge of the Faith*: "seeing that he must needs accommodate himself to the universal intelligence." Where, then, it is a question of parties, whose principles have not yet been worked out, in fact, where no particular point of doctrine



has been submitted to the Holy See for decision, it would, *à fortiori*, be rash and mischievous to claim interior assent for approvals and condemnations, the theological value of which has not been authoritatively determined. It is true, that all the doctrinal instructions of encyclicals, at least after they have been received without protest by the Church, must be presumed to have a sort of infallibility, to use the term improperly, viz: an *ex post facto* immunity from all substantial error of faith or morals, analogous to that enjoyed by the Latin translation of the Vulgate. But as in the case of the Vulgate such infallibility would not justify a Biblical student in setting up every one of its translations as an exegetical certainty; so in the case of an encyclical, a like infallibility, would not enable us to put forward with security all its *doctrinal instructions* as infallibly true, not merely in their substance as regards faith and morals, but in their details and application.

With regard, however, to the condemnation of Lamennais in the "Mirari Vos," Dr. Ward will perhaps urge that the Pope did sufficiently express that he spoke infallibly, though not in that document itself, yet at least in his two subsequent letters to the Bishops of Toulouse and Rennes (apud Ward, pp. 57, 58). But even if such an *ex post facto* ratification in documents certainly not infallible, could be accepted, the passages quoted by Dr. Ward are surely not a sufficient expression of infallibility. Witness the allocution of Sixtus V., quoted by Benedict XIV. (De Canon. lib. i. cap. 43. 2), where the same appeal is made by the Pope to the indefectible faith of Peter that we find in Gregory XVI.'s letters, but of which Benedict says, "ab eo prodiisse tanquam a privato doctore dicendum esse videtur."

In insisting that the Pope,—from that seat which, in its lowest aspect, is at least "the highest watch-tower in Israel,"—cannot speak his mind on doctrinal subjects to the Church with the gravity and solemnity that becomes him, without, as Capellari expresses it, "invoking all his authority," i.e. his infallibility, and so imposing the burden of absolute interior assent upon the consciences of the faithful, Dr. Ward is surely bestowing a most inconvenient gift,

which, like the golden touch of king Midas, is calculated to check the free action of its possessor.

The propositions of encyclicals, so far as I am acquainted with them, do not enunciate any new truth or even any new logical development of an old truth; so that, taken as they stand, in their strictest, i. e. narrowest, sense, no Catholic has any difficulty in accepting them; but they are fresh enunciations of an old truth, with a special significance in the face of a new emergency. I conceive then, that, where the Pope does not condemn a definite proposition as heretical, either formally or in equivalent terms, it is not certain that the Pope is infallibly just (for, after all, it is rather a question of justice than of truth,) in his application of the particular text with which he deals his blow.

To take an imaginary case; of two parties among Catholics in this country, the one may be inclined to go much further in making allowances for their Protestant fellow-countrymen than the other. Let us suppose that the Pope, in a letter addressed to the English Bishops, enunciates the maxim, which of course we all admit, "*Extra ecclesiam nulla salus*," and condemns in strong terms those Catholics who ignore it. This we will suppose every one can see is a distinct blow at the more liberal party. If these are good Catholics, they will receive it respectfully, and will look carefully to see how they may amend what may have deserved such a rebuke. It is unnecessary to remark that both their humility and their loyalty may be put to a severe test, in these days of rampant journalism. The instruction of the Pope, whether infallible or not, instead of being allowed to reach them through the appointed Ecclesiastical channels, the Bishops in the first place, and secondly their own confessors, will be most probably pointed and rammed down their throats with many exhortations to full interior assent, by the Christian courtesy of an orthodox Reviewer: and this perhaps at the very moment when their self-examination is resulting in the conviction, that, though what the Pope enunciated was literally true, yet it was practically a mistake, since it was their opponents, rather than themselves, that deserved rebuke.

The doctrines of encyclicals consist for the most part of the



ignored complements of certain popular or party half-truths. There is no proof that they are intended to do more than throw the weight of the Holy See for the time into the opposite scale. That they do this with, on the whole, a most beneficial result, both as regards truth and order, no body in his senses can doubt. But if this be all, the Pope could not mean to claim for such doctrines an absolute interior assent. On this point the Jesuit Tanner speaks as follows (*De Fide*, tom. iii. p. 274) :—

“ If the Pope issue a decree *in materiâ fidei*, as Pastor of the Church, what he intends directly to teach or determine must be diligently sought and discovered from the circumstances of the case, viz.: the occasion of writing, the nature of the question proposed, the wording of the decree, &c.; and when the direct teaching is found, the words in which it is given are to be weighed. For if he say distinctly—such is a dogma of faith, or the contrary repugneth to Scripture or apostolic tradition, or is heretical or in faith erroneous<sup>5</sup>, or if he otherwise use preceptive words, thereby commanding the whole Church so to hold, and especially if he strike with anathema such as believe and hold otherwise, it is a manifest token, that the Pope defines it; not so, if he forbid the contrary to be taught even under excommunication, for that is universally acknowledged to be insufficient for a sure definition of faith, and the same holds good, as often as it may be gathered from the words and circumstances, that the Pope is only pronouncing a private judgment or proposing something as the more probable doctrine. For the discernment of this matter the judgment of the learned and the sense and consent of the faithful do avail much.”

Tanner then, so far from considering that all the doctrinal instructions of encyclicals are certainly infallible, regards it as our bounden duty to submit them, even when we have eliminated all the *obiter dicta*, to a very severe test indeed, and ends by leaving the decision of what is a definition and what is not, at least in many cases, to the judgment of theologians. This would hardly suit the hot haste of the “ Dublin Review.”

<sup>5</sup> As to the force of this expression vid. *infra de prop. damn.*

Dr. Ward will doubtless say, "I accept Tanner fully, there is no disagreement between us, except that we are speaking of different things. He is speaking of a definition *de fide*, I of a definition certain but not *de fide*."

For the present I must be contented to let the difference or agreement of the two theologians speak for itself, I shall say what I have to say on the value of Dr. Ward's distinction further on, when I speak of the relation of infallibility to the *depositum* and *fides divina*.

We shall appreciate the practical importance of Tanner's criteria if we examine the state of orthodox opinion concerning a case of Papal pronouncement, which might seem from its *primâ facie* simplicity to be exempt from the necessity of any such criticism.

Pope Eugenius IVth, at the Council of Florence, in his doctrinal instruction to the Armenians, with the view of receiving them into unity (vid. Labbæi Conc. tom. xviii. p. 542), after proposing for their acceptance such articles of faith as the "Filioque," and the "Duplex voluntas Christi," proceeds to give them, in a very compendious form, as he says, the Catholic doctrine concerning the seven sacraments, and speaks thus of the sacrament of orders. "Sextum sacramentum est ordinis, cujus materia est illud per cujus traditionem confertur ordo, sicut Presbyteratus traditur per calicis cum vino, et patenæ cum pane porrectionem, Diaconatus per libri Evangeliorum dationem."

"Qua definitione," says Hallier (De Ord. tom. ii. p. 104) "nihil clarius, nihil expressius dici potuit<sup>6</sup>."

The obvious natural meaning of the definition, taken as it stands, is, that, just as water is the entire adequate matter of the Sacrament of Baptism, so is the tradition of the instruments the entire adequate matter of the hierarchical orders;

<sup>6</sup> It is not to my purpose to inquire whether at the date of the issue of Eugenius's "Instruction" the Council of Florence, of which it calls itself a decree, as well as of the Pope, was or was not Œcumenical. Natalis Alexander is the only theologian I have seen who maintains the negative. He says, that, inasmuch as at the date of the issue of the "Instruction," Dec. 1439, the Greeks had been four months gone, mainly to negotiate with whom the Œcumenical Council of Florence had met; the Œcumenical Council had ceased, and what then acted as the Council of Florence was only a provincial Council "idem nomine, non idem auctoritate."

and this is the view taken of it by several theologians, among others by Valentia, and Dom. Soto.

The difficulty in the way of this view is, 1st. That the Catholic Church and Eugenius himself at the Council of Florence acknowledged the validity of Greek orders, and the Greeks in conferring the hierarchical orders only use the imposition of hands. 2nd. That there is no record of the tradition of the instruments in the more ancient documents of the Western Church in the case of the Diaconate and Priesthood; and the Council of Carthage, in the fifth century, speaks of the imposition of hands as standing, in those orders, in the place of the tradition of the instruments in the minor orders.

In order to escape this difficulty, many theologians, among others Bellarmine, Tanner, and the Salmanticenses say, that the Pope, by the term "*materia*," did not mean entire adequate matter, but partial matter, that he only spoke of that part of the matter, that was new to, and as yet unaccepted by the Armenians.

Hallier (op. citat.) and De Lugo, rightly perceiving, that, as long as "*materia*" should be interpreted as essential, even though partial, matter, the validity of Greek orders, and of those of the ancient Western Church would be in jeopardy, take the bold step of denying that the sacrament of orders has any particular matter, by Divine institution, essentially connected with it. De Lugo (De Sacr. in gen. tom. v. p. 18) says, that Christ did not determine the matter and form of this sacrament "in individuo," but only expressed His will, that orders should be conferred by some sensible sign significative of the power given, and by words expressing the same. All difficulties springing from the varying practice of the Church of different times and places are thus met by claiming for the Church the power, as of instituting "in individuo," so of altering the matter of orders. It is true, that De Lugo does not suppose, that the Church has made what once was the matter of orders cease entirely to be so by substituting another totally distinct in its stead, inasmuch as he holds, against Soto and Valentia, that the imposition of hands, as well as the tradition of the instruments, is of the matter, the two together forming one whole; his general principle however is quite capable of justifying a proceeding which does not



materially differ from that which he supposes the Church to have adopted.

Thus the term "*materia*" in the Pope's mouth would be invested with a fresh significance. It would no longer enunciate a fact of divine revelation. It would not express the divinely instituted matter of a sacrament, but merely the fact, that, out of many equally significant matters, the Church has chosen this particular one, as she might subsequently choose another.

Several other authors afterwards adopted this view, and it had been at least ventilated in the schools before Hallier and De Lugo. Tanner and Liberius a Jesu explicitly reject it, as effectively denying the Divine institution of the sacrament of orders, and thereby that it is a sacrament at all.

Liberius a Jesu, and I believe others, as a desperate expedient, meet the difficulty of Greek orders by denying the existence of any real discrepancy between the Eastern and Western ordinations, on the authority of a certain ancient Greek ordinal, which mentions the tradition of the instruments. Surely this ancient ordinal, even if genuine, cannot be allowed any practical weight against the unanimous testimony of the Greeks themselves.

Suarez (De Sacr. in gen. tom. xviii. p. 26.) says of all the sacraments generally, "*Sacramenta omnia eâdem materiâ et formâ constare in universâ Ecclesiâ; atque adeo, id quod in uno loco sufficit, sufficere ubique, ut sacramentum factum teneat, quamvis fortasse peccet minister accidentalem ritum omittendo.*" On this principle, with the practice of antiquity and of the Greek Church before their eyes, a considerable number of theologians, among others, Becanus, Habert, Morinus, Juenin, and Concina assert, that the imposition of hands is the whole essential matter of the sacrament of orders; i. e. all that, when united with the form, is necessary for the validity of the sacrament; at the most they allow (vid. Concina, tom. x. lib. i. cap. 3. p. 19,) the tradition of the instruments to be integrating matter, which does not imply more than that it is matter necessary for the liceity of the sacrament, the result of ecclesiastical ordinance, and so the Pope's term "*materia*" is interpreted to mean *materia integrans* or *minus propria materia*, a more strained interpretation, looking merely

at the words, than any of the preceding ones, but certainly by far the least obnoxious to serious theological difficulties.

Now, though the Pope's decree may be considered, whilst formally addressed to the Armenians, to be of an encyclic nature, inasmuch as it was engaged in laying down the terms of union between them and the whole Church; yet its character throughout is indefinite. Its scope is to give the Armenians a practical compendious view of the doctrinal and ritual changes in which they must be prepared to acquiesce, and so the popular opinion on the matter of orders is given almost in the words of St. Thomas<sup>7</sup>. The Pope could never have meant to decide a question under discussion in the Catholic schools, *en passant* in a negotiation with schismatics. Denzinger (*Enchiridion*) says, "Eam (instructionem) non esse definitionem de ministro materiâ et formâ sacramentorum, ut multi putabant, sed instructionem tantummodo practicam." His view is the legitimate complement of Concina's, since nothing but the purely practical scope of the decree could account for the want of theological accuracy in the use of the term "*materia*." We see then that a practical instruction may be sometimes couched by the Pope in a dogmatic form; which instruction, understood dogmatically, as it was not meant, may be inaccurate, and that this may take place even under the shadow of a General Council.

Whichever theory we may choose to adopt, thus much is clearly deducible from the controversy: that it is well not to be forward in putting our own interpretation upon the Holy Father's words: that where he does not see fit to be his own interpreter, we shall do wisely, whilst practically submitting to his ordinance, in patiently abstaining from an absolute interior assent, and *à fortiori* in refraining from endeavouring to extort it from others, until the course of events enables us to see precisely upon what it is intended our assent should fall; seeking, as Tanner recommends, as far as may be, the requisite commentary in the wisdom of theologians, and the "*sensus*" and "*consensus fidelium*."

Although the limits of the *obligatio fidei* are precise, there

<sup>7</sup> If St. Thomas is quoted on the one side, St. Bonaventura may assuredly be quoted on the other (in 4 Dist. 24, part 2, Art. 19, n. 4).

is, I know, beyond the sphere of certain Catholic truth (which contains all that the Church proposes to be believed *fide divinâ*, at least implicitly by all, and explicitly by the "proveciores" of her children,) and again, beyond those truths which are at least *de fide quoad objectum*, either because they are certainly deducible from directly revealed truths, or because, though truths of fact, they are either the concrete realization of dogma, or are certainly involved in the Church's indefectibility; beyond these truths, I say, there is a wide sphere of probable religious truth, approximating more or less closely to certainty, but never reaching it, within which we are bound to yield not merely the practical assent of obedience, but also a certain degree of internal intellectual adherence, varying according to the nature of the case. These latter truths are qualified by theologians as being, not indeed *de certitudine fidei*, but as *de probabilitate* or *pietate fidei*. Dr. Murray truly observes (De Eccles. Disp. xi. p. 185), "Non acceptare nisi quæ ab auctoritate infallibili, ut sic, traduntur, et heterodoxum proderet et insanum." And Suarez, (De Fide Disp. v. sect. 6, p. 83,) speaks to the same effect: "Quamvis certum non sit, quæ Ecclesia credit tantum ut pia et probabilia, esse vera; si tamen tota Ecclesia in aliquâ hujusmodi re conspirat, tenendum est in eo non errare, non solum practicè, quod est manifestum, sed etiam speculativè." (Cf. Driedo, Append., note C.)

"Speculativè tenendum est," not as certain, with the assent of faith, for it is not proposed to us as certain: and Suarez says, it is not certainly true: but it is to be presumed true, in default of adequate reason to the contrary. A man who went on the principle of denying ecclesiastical miracles, because he was not bound to believe any particular one, besides rendering himself justly suspected of holding some heretical principle in the bottom of his heart, would commit a grievous sin against the *pietas fidei*, although he might innocently reject any one of these miracles on what should appear to him adequate grounds. When we see the sacred Host raised in the priest's hands, we are obliged to worship, but not to make an act of absolute faith that it is the Lord; and indeed we cannot, according to the common opinion, make an absolute, but only a conditional, act of faith, i.e. one depending on the hypo-



thesis, that the necessary conditions of the sacrament have been fulfilled. We are doubtless, in ordinary cases, bound to put away from us, as a temptation, the thought of any such profane contingency, as that of the priest not being ordained, &c.; but not so, if we have any sufficient reason for supposing that such is the case, and we may in particular instances have such reasons. Analogously, I would argue that any one, who should mentally reject as untrue, even whilst punctiliously obeying, any official utterance of the Holy Father, on the ground that it was not infallible, would not only be acting unreasonably, but even sinfully against the *pietas fidei*.

The difference between our obligations towards what is *de certitudine*, and what is only *de probabilitate fidei* is that, as regards the former, we are bound to reject every contrary conclusion as a temptation, though an angel from heaven should enforce it; whilst as regards the latter, we are required to have a *pia voluntas* to accept it as true, to throw the *onus probandi* on the opposite side; but on the other hand, we are not even justified in rejecting contrary arguments, for the general claims of reason are such that we may not "captivate it" to aught less than faith, i. e. the certainty of faith, the Word of God.

To return to the more immediate matter of Dr. Ward's thesis; I thoroughly concur with him in feeling that "If any proposition is indubitably true, on Catholic principles, it is, that the Church possesses whatever infallibility she claims." But as to his argument from the authoritative tone of encyclicals, when I consider how circumspect and slow Popes usually are in defining matters *ex cathedrâ*: that, as Pallavicini says, (Hist. Conc. Trident. lib. i. cap. 21-4,) "the Church, as far as may be, has ever abstained from imposing upon the minds of men that commandment, the most arduous of the Christian law, viz. to believe without doubting obscure matters:" and feeling as I do that where the necessary faith of Catholics is concerned, the principle expressed by "*securus judicat orbis terrarum*" must hold good: remembering also the solemn pomp of language that characterizes even the ordinary utterances of Popes, and their frequent reference to the infallible chair of Peter as their great claim to a respectful hearing, even when speaking on matters on which they are certainly not

pretending to speak infallibly ; I must confess that this main argument of Dr. Ward's for the infallibility of all the doctrinal instructions of all encyclicals seems to me wholly inadequate, and at best to do no more than establish a slight probability. The theological value of such ecclesiastical utterances should be tested by the use theologians make of them. I know that they accept the formal condemnation as false, of propositions, when reduced to its strictest, narrowest sense, as of irrefragable authority ; but I have never found in the treatises of classical theologians any attempt to ground a *certain* argument upon the "doctrinal instructions" of encyclicals as such, i. e. upon propositions they have themselves selected from the letters of Popes. On analogous grounds I should set aside the argument drawn from the language of the French Episcopate. The fact that the French Bishops speak of their doctrine of Infallibility as the ordinary teaching of the Catechism, instead of making for Dr. Ward, goes far to show that they and he are not considering the same question.

It is very noteworthy, that Dr. Ward does not quote from the Bishop of Orleans, although that prelate's pamphlet, "*La Convention et l'Encyclique*," is generally supposed to have been most graciously received at Rome. Dr. Ward, in a recent number of the "*Dublin Review*," has signified his disapproval of the latter half of the bishop's pamphlet, which deals with the Encyclical. This can surprise no one who knows any thing of the spirit of the two writers.

To his argument (p. 49) from the "intolerable intellectual despotism," which a denial of the infallibility of utterances to which we are obliged practically to submit, would ascribe to the Church, I can only say that this is absolutely grotesque as coming from one who does not find the "despotism" of the Pontifical congregations intolerable, to whose utterances Dr. Ward insists upon not merely obedience, but an interior assent being yielded, although he acknowledges that they are not infallible.

## II.

I consider that Dr. Ward has made a grievous mistake in unduly extending the sphere of ecclesiastical infallibility, within



which we as (good) Catholics are bound to yield with an absolute interior assent: but he has done still worse, in making light of the distinction between certain infallibility and probable, improperly called, infallibility. He sets aside this objection, "The gulf is infinite which separates what is of faith from what is not of faith," as being as unphilosophical as it is untheological; and argues as follows, from the analogy of secular science, with its scale of probabilities culminating in certainty: "So in theology, one class of doctrines unquestionably demands the assent of divine faith; of a second class, it is *quite certain* that they are infallibly true, and probable that they are an actual part of the depositum; a third class are beyond all doubt infallibly true, yet with no pretensions to be strictly of faith; of a fourth class it is more or less probable that they are infallibly true, though not infallibly determined; a fifth class are almost certainly true, though not infallibly determined; and so, by degrees, we arrive at those on which every well-instructed Catholic has full liberty to take one side or the other."

This classification is gratuitously minute, and utterly unpractical. One cannot help speculating as to the probable mental condition of the poor man when, after a full course of Dr. Ward's prison discipline, he is at length presented with his liberty. One could imagine that, like the old debtor Mr. Dickens tells us of, when at last made a free man, he would entreat his warder not to lock him out of his accustomed prison.

There is a great weight both of reason and authority, as I hope to show, for the restriction of the Church's infallibility to the enunciation, interpretation, and application of the depositum: and upon this theory I should deny of the 2nd and 3rd classes of Dr. Ward's sub-division that they can be infallibly true, i.e. proposed infallibly as true, so as to demand an absolute interior assent, if it is only probable that they are in any sense part of the *depositum*, and so they would fall through into the fourth and fifth classes, Dr. Ward's distinction of which I am quite unable to understand.

Whatever utterance of ecclesiastical authority leaves us in doubt as to whether it is dealing with the *depositum*, cannot demand the absolute interior assent of Divine faith, due and

possible only to the certain revelation of God. "Assensus fidei supernaturalis et utilis ad salutem stat cum notitiâ solum probabili revelationis. . . ." Prop. Damn. xxi. Innoc. xi.

Besides the assent of Divine faith, there is no other absolute interior assent possible except that of reason, i. e. there is no motive capable of commanding an absolute assent to an *obscure* object but the revelation of God.

The consideration of this part of my subject naturally falls under four main heads:—(1) The correlation of *Fides Divina* and the *Revelation*; (2) The correlation of *Fides Divina* and *Infallibility*; (3) The force of the term *de fide* as used by theologians; (4) Dogmatic Facts. In (1) and (2) I shall endeavour directly to establish my thesis; in (3) and (4) to meet two principal difficulties.

(1) The formal object or intellectual motive, the why, of Divine faith is the authority of God revealing. The material object upon which the assent falls, is that, and that only, which God has revealed. (Cf. Bolgeni, Append. note A.) In spite of the somewhat various expressions of theologians as to the formal object, this may fairly be considered the universal doctrine.

The Proposition of the Church, as the organ of the Holy Spirit, does not enter into the formal object of faith. It is only an efficient cause, or ordinary instrument, or condition *sine quâ non*, in the application of the formal and material objects of faith.

This is supported by a great, I believe the greater, weight of theological authority. De Lugo (De Fide Disp. i. p. 9) says, that the opinion which recurs to the authority of the Church as the organ of the Holy Spirit, for the reason "*ob quam*" the revelation is believed, which Medina and Bannes seem to support, is commonly rejected.

The human authority of the Church, i. e. its proposition of the faith by miracles, martyrs, success, is not the ultimate resolution of the formal object of faith.

The contrary opinion De Lugo (loc. cit. p. 12) pronounces to be "*contra communem sensum theologorum*." His own opinion however seems to admit the human authority of the Church in some sense into the formal object of faith, forming, as he says, the "*apparatus revelationis*." Suarez (De Fide

Disp. iii. § 10, p. 49) denies that either the human or Divine authority of the Church can enter into the *ratio formalis* of our faith. Tanner (vid. Appendix, note A,) declares that nothing is "de fide certum" save what is revealed by God, inasmuch as the Divine revelation is the "*ratio totalis et adæquata*" of all assent and certainty of faith.

The Church has not received nor will receive any new revelations; her sphere lies entirely in the interpretation and application of the original revelation, the *depositum* committed to her by Christ through the Apostles.

Viva says (De Fide, p. 55.) The Church does not receive new revelations, "*sed explicat implicita*:" (for further authorities vid. Appendix, note A.) For this, as far as I know, the *consensus* of theologians is universal.

The idea of a "*fides ecclesiastica*," a something between Divine and human faith, finding its ultimate motive in the authority of the Church, divinely guided by the Holy Spirit, and its adequate material object in every pronouncement of the Church or its head, whether professing to be connected with the *depositum* or not, is not generally countenanced by the classic theologians, although names as considerable as Billuart and Tournely might be urged in its behalf. The theory of *fides ecclesiastica* is clearly an expedient to account for conveniently, and to enforce expeditiously the obligation, whether real or apparent, we may be under of yielding internal assent to what does not, on the face of it, seem to belong to the *depositum*<sup>8</sup>.

Dr. Ward, although not using as far as I know, the term *fides ecclesiastica*, advocates the thing, if I understand him, in its most aggravated form, in arguing for the existence of a class, or rather several classes of objects, in pronouncing on which the Church is certainly infallible, and to which she demands an absolute interior assent, but which are not supposed to be even mediately revealed, or to have any real connexion with any particular truth of the *depositum*. Two courses are open to Dr. Ward. He must either, as does his theological ally, Dr. Murray (vide infra), reduce *fides ecclesi-*

<sup>8</sup> In fact, the term "*Fides Ecclesiastica*" was invented by the French Episcopate, in the emergency of the Jansenist rebellion, for this very purpose.



*astica* to *fides Divina*, in which case, in extending it beyond the *depositum* he becomes obnoxious to all the counter authorities in the Appendix, note A; or he must undertake the defence of a paradox, a nondescript, neither human nor Divine, of which no theologian has been able to give an intelligible explanation. At the best *fides ecclesiastica* is a theory, which cannot lay claim to the exclusive orthodoxy, which alone could warrant Dr. Ward in putting it forward in the absolute way that he has done.

That the *Word of God* or *Revelation*, and *Divine faith* are strictly and exclusively correlatives, and that the habit of Divine faith is given us solely to believe God, is the common judgment of theologians. Viva (De Fide, Index prop<sup>m</sup>. p. 158) says, "Objectum materiale fidei Divinæ est omne et solum a Deo revelatum." The Salmanticenses (De Fide, p. 104.) "Fides Divina non fertur ad objectum, nisi ut vere revelatum." De Lauræa (apud Rocabert, p. 66) "Nihil credi potest fide Divinâ, nisi quod a Deo dicitur."

(2) As to the strict and exclusive correlativity of *Infallibility* and *Divine faith*, I believe the great mass of the theologians, quoted in the Appendix, are in reality agreed, although several of them by their limited application of the term *de fide* have the appearance of regarding Infallibility as more than co-extensive with Divine faith. I hope to suggest an explanation of this when treating of the force of the term *de fide*.

Dr. Ward, however, in his Ninth Essay, puts aside the objection from the formal limitation of the Infallibility of the Pope to pronouncements *de fide*, and condemnations as *heretical*, on the part of certain great Ultramontane authors, by saying that, inasmuch as these writers were actually engaged in, or at least had in view, the Gallican controversy, and Gallicans did not deny the infallibility of the Church in the minor censures; they only took the subject matter of Fides Divina as an example, making the *anathema* the test of an official, and therefore infallible, pronouncement in that particular subject matter, feeling sure that their adversaries, being once forced to admit the Pope's infallibility in pronouncements *de fide*, would not deny it in the minor censures.

Now upon this I will remark; 1st, That, supposing Dr. Ward to be right, and that by *anathema* is to be understood

"anathema or any of the minor censures," the objection still holds good as against those doctrinal instructions of encyclicals, which contain no technical approval or censure.

2nd, That Dr. Ward is wrong in assuming as he does (p. 195) that "if the objector's interpretation were correct—if the question turned at all upon the *object* and not merely upon the *subject* of infallibility—the theologians, on whom he rests, would of course be equally anxious to add the same qualification, when they are speaking not of the Pope's but of the Church's infallibility."

On the contrary, these theologians would not be anxious to add the same qualifications, when speaking of the Church's infallibility, for the obvious reason that, though as Ultramontanes they might hold that, as regards pronouncements *de fide*, the Pope was on an equality with the Church in Council, they had no idea of denying that the Church possesses an infallibility, not merely when she put on her robes of prophecy, but inherent in her very vital action, which the Pope by himself does not; that, as Perrone says (in the passage apud Ward, p. 81), clearly speaking of the Church dispersed, she is our infallible guide "*vivâ voce et praxi*," which the Pope is not; that the human authority of the Church, founded on numbers, holiness, wisdom, &c., being indefinitely greater than the human authority of a Pope, who need be neither wise nor holy; the Church might settle without provoking doubt and still less opposition a number of border questions, which the Pope could not. The Ultramontane theologians had narrowed the base, so to speak, of Ecclesiastical authority; they had made it centre in an individual, subject to numberless accidents of individual temper and circumstance; and therefore it was of vital importance that they should distinguish sharply the Divine from the human element, the *objecta*, as to which they claimed for the Pope certain infallibility, from those as to which they could not prove that he was not fallible. They had to meet numberless historical objections, plausible at least, grounded upon the apparent mispronouncements of Popes *in materiâ fidei*, and they dared not undertake the defence of more than it was necessary for their position to defend, or than they could defend satisfactorily. I grant that their primary intention was

to discuss the *subject* of infallibility, but there was no possibility of discussing the *subject*, without perpetual reference to the *objects* of infallibility.

I do not think it possible to read the subjoined passages without being convinced that this is the true account of the matter.

Ballerini (de Primatu, cap. xv. § 6.) speaks thus :—

“It is that faith, or doctrine of faith—which, in controversies of faith, is set forth by the Popes, in order to confirm their brethren and all the faithful in the faith, and to exact and preserve in the Church Catholic the unity of the same faith—to which the privilege of inerrancy, according to Christ’s promise, must be vindicated. Thus it only attaches to such *definitions of faith* as are set forth by the supreme Pontiffs against heresies and errors springing up *in materiâ fidei*, and not to judgments which, though they establish something, do not decree any thing to be believed *ex Catholicâ fide*, or condemned as contrary to the same.” . . .

“When they (the Popes) condemn with such formulas as to signify that they are putting forth Catholic doctrine, and so proscribe an error as that all who hold otherwise shall be without the Catholic and Roman faith, and when they declare these separate from the Communion and Unity of the Roman Church, smite them with anathema, or brand the propositions they are condemning with the note of heresy or other equivalent censure, then according to Christ’s promise they cannot be in error.”

(§ 10.) He requires, as the two necessary conditions of an infallible definition of faith, “First, That its subject matter should pertain to the essentials of faith and morals, and pertain *per se* and proximately, not accidentally and remotely. Secondly, That it should express that it is to be believed *de fide*.”

Again (Appendix, de Infallibilitate Pontificiâ, § 10.) he says :—

“Though there be clear and evident error *in materiâ fidei* (on the part of the Pope) it does not make against our thesis and demonstration, if it cannot be at the same time shown to be an error in a *definition of faith*. For since their authority has been given to the Roman Pontiffs in order to preserve



amid dissensions the unity of faith, and the unity of faith amidst disputes and controversy *circa fidem* can be vindicated by the governors of the Church no otherwise, than by expressly defining what is to be believed or condemned *ex Catholico dogmate*; and that, so expressly and precisely, as that the obligation of assenting and securing unity should be evident from the *form of words*, whatever is beside such a definition, and does not sufficiently express the duty of unity, inasmuch as it does not regard the end of the primacy, so cannot be said to be such an outcome of the authority of the primacy, as that the prerogative of *infallibility* should be attributed to it."

Gregory XVI. (Il Triompho della S<sup>a</sup> Sedia, tom. ii. p. 22, et seq.) says, "There must be clear and unmistakable notes by which we may distinguish the cases in which the Pope pronounces solemnly or *ex cathedrâ* from those cases in which his decisions have not this character." . . . "The intrinsic notes" are, "1st, The point defined by the Pope must belong to the faith." "2nd, The judgment must express that the Pope's mind is absolutely made up on the point." "3rd, He must make his decision known to the Church." "4th, He must address the Church herself." "5th, The terms in which the definition is conceived must manifest the Pope's intention to command *absolutely*, and in virtue of his supreme authority, *an act of faith* in this or that *determinate article*."<sup>9</sup>

Suarez (De Fide, Disp. v. sect. 8. p. 86) enumerates the different members of the Pope's power, "ad varias materias pertinentia," as first, supreme power of jurisdiction *in foro sacramentali*; second, supreme jurisdiction *in foro Ecclesiastico*, with its subdivisions, and thus concludes: "It only then remains to speak of the power of defining or teaching the Church with infallibility. . . . It is a Catholic verity, that the Pope defining *ex cathedrâ* is a rule of faith that cannot fail, "quando aliquid authentice proponit, tanquam de fide Divinâ credendum."

The Salmanticenses (Dogmat. de Rom. Pont. p. 182) allow that the Pope *ex cathedrâ* may err "in rebus quæ non sunt de substantiâ fidei."

<sup>9</sup> The 4th note excludes allocutions and Apostolic letters to particular Bishops; the 5th, many doctrinal instructions in many encyclicals.

Acta Colloquii Ratisbonnensis—a *vivâ voce* controversy conducted on the one side, by the Jesuits, Gretser and Tanner; on the other, by certain Lutheran Divines (Sess. 3. p. 29.)

“Hailbronner). Quis dicet populo Christiano, an Pontifex ex cathedrâ definiat ut Pontifex, an ut privatus?

“Gretser). Quando aliquid pronuntiat et definit ex cathedrâ sub anathemate, tunc pronuntiat ut Pontifex, et non errat; et cum per bullam obligat totam Ecclesiam, tunc itidem certum est illum pronuntiare, ut Pontificem.

“Hailbronner). Non audio solutionem veram, sed respon- sionem a vobis peto ad priorem quæstionem.

“Gretser). Additur signum, qui non obsequitur anathema sit, ex quo dignoscitur pronuntiasse illum, ut Pontificem.”

The controversial character of this last passage is an additional pledge of its doctrinal accuracy; since prudence required, that the Catholic disputant should occupy certain ground; consideration for the souls of his opponents, that he should occupy necessary ground.

I leave it to my readers to decide, whether, if either Ballerini or Gretser had Dr. Ward's theory *in petto* as a certain Catholic truth, they were not most dishonest knaves.

I shall return to Ballerini's view as to minor censures, when formally engaged with condemned propositions.

(3) It will be to the purpose here to examine the theological force of the expression *de fide*, as to the precise meaning of which Dr. Ward has left us very much in the dark.

The term *de fide*, of faith, is somewhat variously used by authors. The full expression is *De Fide Divinâ Catholicâ; Divina*, to distinguish it from the *fides humana*, which is due to the Church in virtue of its holiness, miracles, prescription of success, &c., (vid. inter alios Salmanticenses, Dogm. de Fide, p. 56.); *Catholica*, to distinguish it, or more immediately its subject matter, as contained in the *depositum* committed by Christ through the Apostles to His Church, from the matter of private revelation, which according to most authors—the Jesuits generally—carries with it, as far as the recipient of the revelation is concerned, an obligation of believing, and elicits a real supernatural act of Divine faith.

Many theologians, Scotus (in 3. Dist. 35.), Canus (de Loc. cap. ult. ad 10, p. 207.), Vega (Trident. lib. 9, cap. 39,



p. 257.), Vasquez (tom. i. Disp. 5, cap. 3, p. 14.), Anton. Cordub. (Quæst. Theol. qu. vii. p. 146.), Driedo (de Dogmat. Var. p. 211.), Tanner (tom. iii. de Fide, qu. 1. Dist. 3, p. 23.), Cardinal de Lauræa (De Decretis. Eccles. Disp. 6, Art. 3, p. 75, apud Rocabert. tom. xv<sup>10</sup>.), and Viva (de Fide, Disp. 2. Quæst. 2, Art. 2, p. 57.) regard as objectively *de fide*, that is to say, as really, though implicitly, contained in the *depositum* and therefore capable of definition, all that may be certainly deduced from the expressed truths of the *depositum*; thus including all conclusions, not only from two revealed premisses, but also from one revealed premiss and one certain naturally, although such a conclusion is not *de fide* “quoad obligationem” —before the definition of the Church—except for such as are convinced of the certainty of the illation.

But Suarez, De Lugo, and the Salmanticenses (inter alios) insist very strongly that, what they call a purely virtual inclusion, i. e., in the revealed premiss, in contradistinction to a formal though confused inclusion, is not sufficient to constitute an object of faith. The two former meet the question, “How if the Church define it?” by equalizing in some sort the authoritative definition of the Church with a fresh revelation; Suarez indeed uses language which has exposed him to the charge of upholding new revelations. De Lugo (Disp. 1. sect. 13, §. 1) expressly repudiates the idea of a fresh revelation, and ends, after what looks like a fruitless struggle to maintain his position, by suggesting a solution of the difficulty in the distinction of *de fide quoad objectum*, and *quoad obligationem*, and so virtually throws his authority into the opposite scale. The Salmanticenses say boldly, that the Church cannot define as *de fide* what is *only* virtually contained in a revealed premiss, although she may approve “Theologorum discursum tanquam legitimum, et consentaneum rebus fidei.” The stock example of such a purely virtual inclusion is *visibilitas* as a property of Christ in His revealed manhood. The rationality of Christ, as entering into the definition of manhood, is the example of a virtual quasi-formal, though confused inclusion, and universally pronounced to be *de fide*.

<sup>10</sup> In the portion of De Lauræa’s Treatise selected by Rocabert, he does not in so many words give his adherence to this opinion; but his whole treatment of the subject seems to me necessarily to imply it.

It would be a laborious and hardly profitable task, to follow theologians through all the different distinctions, on which they assert, or deny, that the conclusion from two revealed premisses, or from one revealed and one natural is *de fide*. The ancient opinion, which I have given first, is exceedingly well supported, and has at least the *primâ facie* advantage of simplicity; neither can I believe that any theologian would have seen cause to depart from it except for the once popular notion that the syllogism, as a certain process, might be some thing more than an evolution. All the contending parties are ready to admit the reality of implicit revelation, and none go the length, as far as I have seen, of expressly denying that a proposition, found to be equivalent to a proposition of the *depositum*, by whatever process, provided that process be indubitably certain, is *de fide quoad objectum*, and *quoad obligationem* for the individual who has gone through the process and is convinced of its certainty. When then theologians say, that such a proposition is *de fide*, they mean one of two things, either, that it is *de fide quoad obligationem*, a part of the depositum proposed by the Church to be believed as either explicitly or implicitly revealed.—“*Hæc est fides Catholica, quam nisi quisque fideliter firmiterque crediderit, salvus esse non poterit*”—or, merely *quoad objectum*, i. e., ultimately deducible by reason from a truth of revelation, although the correctness of the process, and so the truth of the conclusion, has not received the stamp of the Church’s definition. The obligation of believing the latter truth does not extend beyond those who have deduced it from revelation, i. e., found it in revelation, except so far as the unanimous, or quasi-unanimous authority of theologians in its favour, may involve an obligation, *ex pietate fidei*, of presuming it true where there is no irrefragable reason to the contrary: but as the discovery of such contrary reason is in the highest degree improbable, one who shall deny such a proposition, becomes justly liable to certain of the minor censures. I think this fact of the twofold and often confused use, on the part of theologians, of the term *de fide* will go far to harmonize with my view of the exclusive correlativeness of infallibility and *fides Divina* the language of some of my authorities, who seem to enforce the certainty of a proposition which at the same time they assert to be not

*de fide* : as Suarez does for instance, as regards the proposition "Hic canonizatus est beatus." Benedict XIV. (de canonizatione, lib. i. cap. 45. in. fin.) whilst manifestly inclining to the opinion, which makes the beatitude of the canonized saint *de fide*, affirms that it is not *de fide Catholicâ*, or *quoad obligationem*, and so, that the deniers of the saint's beatitude cannot be censured as heretical, but only as temerarious.

(4) Cardinal de Lauræa, writing in Rome subsequently to the Jansenist controversy, advocates the opinion, which includes as *de fide* all that the explicit propositions of the *depositum* include, either as a *principium* its conclusion, or as a numerical whole the individuals that go to form it; and expressly applies it not only to the particular facts which the ancient theologians had under consideration, viz., the beatitude of this canonized saint, the worthiness of this approved order, the Popedom of the reigning Pontiff, but also to such facts as that of the heresy of Jansenius.

He speaks thus (apud Rocabert, loc. cit.) "Such conclusions as by a necessary consequence are deduced from *principia* expressly and clearly revealed, as long as they are merely deduced by theologians, are theological conclusions, although really *de fide* if necessarily deduced; when however they are asserted by the Church or the Pope to be necessarily deduced, and as such are proposed to the Church, they are true objects of faith, because they are virtually and in their premisses revealed." (P. 76.) "All that is necessary for salvation, and for the government of the Universal Church, has already been revealed, either explicitly, or implicitly, according to the promise of Christ, that the Holy Spirit should teach the Apostles 'omnem veritatem,' and as often as the Church proposes any thing to be believed or practised throughout the Universal Church, she extracts it from what has already been revealed or delivered."

Doubtless theologians, in laying down the subject-matter of *Fides Divina*, have had before their eyes not only our Lord's promise, "Docebit vos omnia quæcunque dixi vobis," but also that other promise which is itself a truth of the depositum, "Et portæ inferi non prævalebunt adversus eam." Whenever it is either clear from the nature of the case, or it has been so declared by the Church, that any particular error is equivalent



to the prevailing of the gates of hell, it is *de fide* that the Church cannot fall into it. It is evident, that for the Church to define, as of faith, what is not of faith, would be an error of this kind, it would be a stultification of the Church's claims. Again, for the Church to issue a law, prescribing any violation of the Gospel, or of the natural Law, would be another such evident failure. On this account theologians are commonly agreed, that there are certain facts in dealing with which the Church must be infallible, e.g. the fact involved in the canonization of a saint, or the approval of a religious order, because the scandal of an error *quoad substantiam*, i. e. as to the fact that the saint is in heaven, that the approved order is a way of perfection, would be so great as to be a very prevailing of the gates of hell. The other case of dogmatic fact dealt with is the Popedom of the reigning Pontiff, and here they say again, that the Universal Church cannot be deceived in so grave a matter. Although theologians argue generally for the infallibility of the Church as to these three facts, with a special reference to her indefectibility, yet there are not wanting indications in other authors of the theory which De Lauræa puts forward so explicitly. For instance Suarez and De Lugo deduce the "Hic est Papa" from the Universal "omnis rite electus est Papa," revealed in its equivalent, "Tu es Petrus, et super hanc petram ædificabo Ecclesiam meam," and the Salmanticenses, the "Hic sanctus est beatus" from the "Beatus vir" of Scripture. The meaning of this latter being, as I take it, that not only the comprehension of a proposition is revealed to the Church, e.g. that such are rewarded with eternal life, that of such is the kingdom of heaven, but *in confuso* the extension also, the numerical whole of the elect is revealed to her, the individuals of which she is enabled to evolve and identify, by the assistance of the Holy Spirit preventing her own diligence, as occasion requires.

Whatever may be thought of the value of this theory, it is at least an evidence of the supreme importance its advocates conceived it to be, to connect the infallible utterances of the Church with the *depositum*. I think it may be regarded as at the same time an extension, and a limitation of the sphere of the Church's possible definitions. It need hardly be said, that



it in no way dispenses with the necessity of the precise definitive forms which Ballerini requires, before what is *de fide quoad objectum* can become *de fide quoad obligationem universalem*.

It may perhaps be asked, since you allow that the Church is the judge of her own infallibility, what is the meaning of insisting so much on an objective criterion of it? I answer, that of course none of the theologians, who are discussing what the Church can define and what she cannot, dream of denying that when once the Church has clearly and certainly defined any thing as *de fide*, the question of her power so to define, is settled,—*solvitur ambulando*; but, on the other hand, where the particular force and intention of the Church's pronouncements is uncertain, it is surely obvious to judge of what she does, upon a theory of what she can do.

It is far easier doubtless, but hardly so satisfactory to inquiring minds, to write a treatise *de Ecclesiâ*, into which the more convenient portions of *de Fide* may be introduced, than, as the older theologians used, to treat the Church as a function of faith, in a treatise *de Fide*. The ancient treatment was scientific, the modern is political. (Cf. Van Loo, *Introd. in Theol. Dogm.* p. 37.)

I believe Dr. Ward considers (vide p. 34) that the Pope's pronouncement of the existence of the five propositions in the Augustinus, has exploded for ever the idea of the limitation of the Church's infallibility in any sense to the *depositum*. It will be well then to look more particularly at the facts of the condemnation of Jansenius and the state of Catholic opinion on the subject. I would premise, that it is important, whilst considering the strict theological import of the controversy, as far as possible, to give the Jansenists credit for the convictions and intentions they professed. Doubtless some of them were consistently honest, and many who were subsequently guilty of manifest dishonesty, seem to have begun honestly. No doubt the position of *honest* resistance to constituted authority, even when the cause is objectively good, is a most difficult one to maintain.

Of course all Catholics acknowledge, as did the Jansenists themselves, that the Church or Pope, when the five propositions were presented to him by one of the contending parties, was infallible in pronouncing that they were heretical, or stood

in a certain real opposition to a truth of the *depositum*. It was generally acknowledged that the five propositions, condemned as Jansenius's, were not his *totidem verbis*; so the Jansenists, some of whom had been intimate with the author of the Augustinus, denied that these propositions either represented his interior mind, or were the natural interpretation of his words. Here then were two facts, one psychological, regarding the mind of the deceased Jansenius, the other turning upon a question of interpretation, not of grammatical interpretation simply, but of the natural effect and influence of a certain theological treatment. Of course it was obvious for the friends of Jansenius to interpret the Augustinus by what they knew of the author, but they seem to have forgotten, that, whilst our thoughts are morally what our intention makes them, yet when once they are crystallized into words, they become possessed of an independent being, an intention, a significance of their own, which may be pronounced immoral or dangerous, as a statue or picture may, without involving as a necessary consequence any condemnation of the man, the moral being, who gave them birth. The Pope met the Jansenists by condemning the five propositions "*in sensu auctoris*." This specification refers, as Perrone says, to the *objective* not to the *subjective* sense of Jansenius, to the ideal scope of his work, not to that present to his conscience: so that Jansenius the author was condemned, not Jansen the man.

The Jansenists then asserted the distinction of *jus* and *factum*, doctrine and fact, allowing that the Pope was infallible in pronouncing on the former, but not on the latter; and so, whilst professing the assent of faith to the decision *de jure*, they only proffered a respectful silence as to the decision *de facto*. After this, the theological import of the controversy is somewhat obscured by the manifest dishonesty of the Jansenists, who, whilst professing to keep a respectful silence, really busied themselves unceasingly in writing down the Pope's Brief. The Pope in consequence condemned the respectful silence, and prescribed a form reiterating in one breath the decision *de jure* and *de facto*, to which all Ecclesiastics were called upon to subscribe.

It remains to be considered, what general conclusion as to

the Church's infallibility may be deduced from the facts of the controversy, i. e. how far has the Church, in her dealings with the Jansenists, defined her infallibility in this subject-matter?

De Lauræa accepts the decision *de jure* and *de facto* as a legitimate outcome of the *depositum*. Dr. Ward, on the contrary, would ground upon the decision *de facto* an extension of the Pope's infallibility to a large class of matters really unconnected with the *depositum*. De Lauræa says (loc. cit. p. 192), "The Church does not, as some have wrongly supposed, require two assents of faith, one to the fact, the other to the dogma; nor an assent, one really, but virtually twofold "*nempe ut terminatum ad factum et ad jus*," as though we were obliged to assent to each *fide divinâ*; but we are called upon to assent to both at once by one act of faith, the assent only falling upon the fact "*ut subjectum conflans objectum fidei*." Perrone, speaking on this point uses much the same language as De Lauræa, specifying the Pope's decision as "*de jure concreto*." Now if we look at the formula, as prescribed by Alexander VII. (vid. Tournely, de Gratiâ, tom. ii. folio, p. 258) we shall see, that, whilst the Jansenists distinguished as separable the *jus* and the *factum*, the Pope does not accept their distinction and pronounce on each point, but is careful to deal with both as one subject-matter. Again, when the Belgian Bishops, in 1694 (vid. Tournely, loc. cit. p. 258), make certain explanatory additions to the formula in which the two points of the *jus* and *factum* are asserted severally, Pope Innocent XII., in his Brief of February 6, 1694, rejects their additions, and prescribes that the original formula be left for ever intact without any addition or explanation whatsoever. It is worthy of remark, that the Brief concludes thus:—

"Demum injungimus, ne ullâ ratione quemquam vagâ istâ accusatione, et invidioso nomine *Jansenismi* traduci aut nuncupari sinatis, nisi prius suspectum esse constiterit, aliquam ex his propositionibus docuisse aut tenuisse<sup>1</sup>."

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Murray, Tract. de Ecclesiâ, Disp. xvii. p. 243. This prohibition must have escaped Dr. Murray, or he would have told us which of the five Jansenist propositions *de Gratiâ* he suspects the late conductors of the Home and Foreign Review of holding, before branding them, as he has, with the invidious name of Jansenist. Bolgeni (Fatti Dommatici, vol. i. cap. 1, No. 2) thinks it necessary



In the Jansenist controversy a great theological question was at stake, clearly belonging to the sphere of the Church's infallibility. The Church's sphere is not merely abstract truth, for if she were confined to this, she would be practically useless, as a moral teacher. Synonymous with the doctrine of the *depositum*, that such a proposition *de Gratiâ* is the Catholic faith, is the doctrine, that all who deny it are at least material heretics; but if the Church must stop here and cannot go on to identify the deniers, of whose character and coming the Scriptures testify, her knowledge of the truth is practically worthless.

To what purpose would it be, if, having accepted the Church's doctrine, that all men are born in sin, we were allowed to except any of our acquaintance in particular, on the ground of the Church not being able to define that any of these individuals are men, or indeed, what precisely are the constituents of humanity? The Jansenists were unwittingly applying a solvent to the whole principle of Church authority, which, if allowed its way, could have ended in nothing short of universal scepticism. I conceive then that the decision *de jure concreto* is in no way calculated to ground an extension of the Church's infallibility to matters unconnected with the *depositum*.

I acknowledge, with De Lauræa, the Pope's infallibility in dealing with dogmatic facts, as the complement of dogmatic propositions, the concrete realizations of the "*hæc est fides Catholica*." "*Si in hoc erro, non solum tutò, sed libenter erro, nec mihi errorem utilem, quo etiam delector, sine rationis præsertim vi extorqueri volo*." When, however, the further question is raised, whether the proposition, "the Pope or Church's infallibility extends to dogmatic facts," besides being *de fide quoad objectum*, as I conceive it to be, is also *de fide quoad obligationem universalem*, I must confess my conviction that it is not, founded on these grounds. 1. The Pope, when denouncing the Jansenist opponents of the fact, calls them troublers of the Church's peace, not heretics; it is the French

to explain that his application of the term "Jansenist" to the defenders of the Augustinus does not fall under the Pope's prohibition, as indeed it obviously does not, since the defenders of the Augustinus had fairly rendered themselves "suspected of holding the five propositions."



Bishops only who use the latter term. 2. Two theological writers well known, and whose theological writings have never been censured, Muratori, the contemporary and friend of Benedict XIV., in his work "De Moderatione Ingeniorum &c.," and the German Franciscan, Chrismann, in his "Regula Fidei," republished as lately as 1854 at Wurzburg, as well as in Migne's "Cursus Theologicus"—both deny in so many words the Church's infallibility as regards dogmatic facts.

As there is, I believe, a suspicion in some minds, that Muratori's book, "De Moderatione," was censured by Benedict XIV., the following relation will not be out of place.

In one of Muratori's numerous controversies, an adversary threw out the charge that the Pope had condemned some of his writings, in his letter of the 31st of July, 1748, to the Prefect of the Spanish Inquisition. Upon this Muratori immediately wrote to his Holiness on the subject. The Pope answered him thus:—"Quod illa quæ censurâ digna in operibus suis deprehenderit, non dogma aliquid, non disciplinam, sed tantum jurisdictionem temporalem Pontificis in suis statibus seu dominio tangunt." Romæ, apud S. Mariam Majorem, die 25 Sep. 1748<sup>2</sup>. This is just thirteen years after the last edition of the "De Moderatione," corrected by the author. The Pope appears to be referring to the fact, that Muratori, in his history of the House of Este, took their side in a territorial dispute with the Holy See. (See "Vita et Opera Muratorii." By Pet. Obladen. August. Vindel. 1765.) The "De Moderatione" is moreover quoted by Benedict XIV. in his "De Canonizatione," as a theological authority.

Dr. Murray, in the very important and valuable Treatise he has just published "De Ecclesiâ," seems to take a somewhat different view as to the connexion of the truths, we are bound to believe, with the *depositum*, from any of the theologians I have referred to. He divides (Disp. xvii. p. 202 et seq.) the objects of the infallible authority of the Church into two classes. The first contains the verities immediately revealed, or, as he generally expresses it, "revealed," and therefore de-

<sup>2</sup> The words of censure which the Pope thus explains are quoted by Westhoff in his Preface to Ballerini's "De Potestate Ecclesiasticâ," and he refers for the entire document to the Bullarium of Benedict XIV., vol. xiii. Supplement. Mechlin, 1827.

finer, or definable *de fide*: the second, verities, which, although not revealed, are in various ways closely connected with what are revealed. These he calls verities "theological and Catholic;" they consist of theological conclusions, propositions proximate to faith, i. e. esteemed generally by theologians to be certainly revealed, the positive contradictories of propositions condemned as theologically unsound, and dogmatic facts. None of these truths of the second class he says, are capable of being defined *de fide*, i. e. of being declared really revealed, and being believed as such: but yet these *veritates non revelatae*, when defined or proposed to us by the Church, are believed by a true act of Divine faith, into which the *habitus fidei* inflows. He acknowledges that he disagrees with De Lugo (and he might have added the whole *schola*), in considering that Divine faith is not given us to believe "in omne et solum a Deo revelatum." "Fides Divina non tendit ad objectum nisi ut vere revelatum" (Salmant. p. 104), is the common testimony of all theologians. I do not understand how Dr. Murray can maintain that these verities of the second class are believed by Divine faith, i. e. on God's authority, whilst by denying the reality of their revelation, he both cuts them off from the authority of God, and breaks down an essential ground of the Church's infallibility in their regard.

If we compare the modern German school on this point, taking Chrismann as its representative, with Dr. Murray, we shall find a considerable analogy between them, although their scope is directly opposite, the one endeavouring to confine within its strictest limits, the other to extend to the utmost, the sphere of Ecclesiastical infallibility. The German Divine by denying the reality, and so the definableness of purely implicit revelation, would limit, if I do not mistake him, the Church's infallibility strictly to the expressed truths of the *depositum*. The Irish Divine cuts off from the *depositum*, and would establish on an independent basis, a large body of verities, universally accounted certain, in the shape of theological conclusions, in order that they may, as it were, throw the cloak of their infallibility over such outlying, less generally accepted, verities, as dogmatic facts, and the propositions of encyclicals.

I am not now reviewing Dr. Murray, and I should not have

referred to him here, except that I believe his theory approaches as closely as may be to Dr. Ward's, and seems indeed to have been accepted by that gentleman as his own, in the pages of the "Dublin Review." By what ingenious eclecticism Dr. Ward manages to reconcile himself to a theory which denies, or at least renders nugatory the doctrine of development which he is commonly supposed to defend, I am at a loss to conceive.

On the one point, on which Dr. Ward acknowledges a disagreement with Dr. Murray (see "Dublin Review," October, 1866), I cannot but think that he is in the wrong. Dr. Murray, with most theologians, uses the term, "*ex Cathedrâ*," as co-extensive with "*ut Papa*," in contradistinction to "*ut Doctor privatus*." Dr. Ward would confine the term to the Pope, speaking as Universal Doctor. He objects that Dr. Murray, by his use of the term, includes under it many fallible pronouncements. Dr. Ward's object is clear. The very idea of fallibility must not be associated with the *Cathedra Petri*. The older theologians were contented with saying, the Pope *ex Cathedrâ*, in such a sphere, under such circumstances, is infallibly preserved from error; under such other circumstances may yield to human infirmity.

Many of our modern writers seem to consider that they better preserve the inviolability of Papal authority by splitting up the Pope, so to speak, into different personalities. By this process they are at once enabled to produce the effect of isolating from his *Cathedra* any undeniable errors, and on the other hand to erect the different aspects of Papal authority into so many quasi-independent sources of infallibility. To give an instance of the latter process, some of these theologians argue thus: the Pope is infallible as *Testis*, as *Judex* and as *Doctor Universalis*; if he cannot decide infallibly the Jansenist fact as *Testis*, he can as *Judex* or as *Doctor Universalis*: as if the Church's infallibility, as *Judex* and *Magistra*, did not depend wholly upon her infallibility as *Testis*, with which the two former cannot be more than co-extensive. Is not this something like the lion's hunting in the fable? after the prey had been divided into three parts, the royal beast thus proceeded: The first part I claim, because I am the Lion; the second I may fairly claim, because I am the king of beasts; and as for



the third portion, I can only say that I should like to see any one lay claw upon it.

Dr. Murray's use of the term *ex Cathedrâ* appears to me as philosophical as his use of the term *de fide* is otherwise. The latter term refers immediately and directly to the act of Divine Catholic faith, which certain objects are qualified to elicit. It refers to the *depositum* only mediately and indirectly, as representing as least *in radice* the only objects so qualified. Surely it is unreasonable to refuse the term to objects for which you demand the assent of Divine Catholic faith, because, upon some theory, you have excluded them from the *depositum*.

### III.

On the subject of condemned propositions, Dr. Ward (p. 8.) says, "It would be itself a mortal sin, if possessing such knowledge" (i. e. that the Church or Pope had condemned a certain proposition as theologically unsound), "I dared to embrace it as true, or doubt its falsehood." Now "*theologically unsound*" is a general term, covering all theological censure, and as such Dr. Ward invariably uses it. I am warranted therefore by this passage in interpreting the other passages in his book, in which he lays down, that every proposition condemned as theologically unsound is infallibly condemned, to mean that every proposition censured with any one of the minor censures, is infallibly, i. e. certainly false, and that it is a mortal sin to doubt its falsity.

In his Preface (p. xix.), he argues from the fact of condemnations *in globo*,—in which a number of propositions are condemned *respectivè*, some as heretical, others as unsound in a lesser degree, without its being specified at all which censure belongs to which proposition;—that every proposition must be infallibly condemned, i. e. that the minor censure which at least must attach to each proposition, must involve certain falsity; otherwise, not knowing which was the heretical one, you could not know certainly, of any one proposition, that it was infallibly condemned or false, and so condemnations *in globo* would be nugatory.

Paul Sarpi had objected to the condemnations *in globo* in



Leo Xth's Bull against Luther, that they were futile, inasmuch as they were "sub incertâ quâdam verborum clausulâ," so that it could not be known which censure appertained to which proposition. Cardinal Pallavicini (Hist. Conc. Trident. lib. i. cap. 21. 4) thus answers him :—

"Neither does this reason fail to justify their use, namely, seeing that for any article to be established as a dogma of faith, it should be both weighed in the nicest scales, and a supreme necessity should press for it, inasmuch as a declaration of this kind enjoins that thing upon the minds of men, which is the most arduous of all in the Christian Law, viz. to believe without doubting obscure matters: for this reason the Church has, as far as was lawful, ever abstained from it; but because there are many doctrines which incline men to heresy, and inflict other inconveniencies, it is right to banish them from their *tongues* and *pages*, and for this it is not necessary that they should be *certainly* repugnant to the Word of God, but it is enough if there be grave symptoms of this repugnance from their opposition to the common consent of the *schola*, or the ancient practice of the Church, or the authority of the Holy Fathers, or if they are perceived to be fruitful of acts prejudicial to the Christian republic: and thus they would merit some one of the above-mentioned censures; just as, for a stranger to be excluded from a town, it is not always necessary that he should be plague-stricken, or an enemy, but it is enough if he be suspected of plague or hostility."

"The Pope then was not minded in this document to remove all doubt, (with which sort of doubt it has pleased God that almost all the sciences of this life should be beset, and more especially theology as engaged with themes that are very obscure and far surpass our understanding,) but only intended that we should be just so far certain as was needful, declaring all these propositions pernicious if enunciated, dangerous if believed."

Now if we were obliged to assent to the falsity of every one of these propositions whatever censure might belong to it, the condemnation *in globo* would, as much as any other, impose upon us the obligation of assenting without doubting to obscure matters. Pallavicini is intelligible, only on the sup-

position of his holding that certain of the minor censures at least do not carry with them the obligation of assenting to the falsity of the propositions to which they may be attached. He considers that the very object of condemnations *in globo*, is to banish from our "lips and pages" dangerous propositions, without imposing upon our minds that burden of interior absolute assent, which Dr. Ward is so anxious to impose upon us under pain of mortal sin.

The following is an abstract of the account the Salmanticenses give of the principal censures (De Fide, p. 314).

For a proposition to be "*damnabilis*," it need not be false but must necessarily be in some sort opposed to a doctrine of faith, either immediately and directly, or mediately and indirectly, by its opposition to that which faith indirectly dictates in the action of other virtues, or by smoothing the way to an error contrary to faith. The censures are regulated according to the greater or less opposition of propositions to a doctrine of faith.

An *heretical* proposition is one that is directly opposed to an immediately revealed verity of the Catholic faith.

An *erroneous* proposition (clearly the same as *hæresi proxima*) is one immediately and evidently opposed to a verity revealed by God mediately and secondarily, i. e. to a theological conclusion.

To the preceding category may be reduced the proposition *proximate to error*, which is opposed to a verity deduced *ex principio fidei* by a process not metaphysically evident, but morally certain.

A proposition *savouring of heresy* is one which although it is not, or does not manifestly appear to be heresy, yet smacks of it, on account of its agreement in words or accidental form of expression with some heresy, as since Luther's time is the proposition "*Fides justificat*," although of itself it hath an orthodox meaning, and is found in Holy Writ.

Some propositions "*ex seipsis*" savour of heresy, as for instance, "It is ridiculous to carry the Blessed Sacrament through the public streets."

A *temerarious* proposition asserts or denies something concerning a doctrine of faith, theology, or morals without sufficient foundation. As to assert, "*Maternitatem Christi Domini*

includere perfectionem physice infinitam;" or as I would suggest, with all due deference to Dr. Ward, to assert in a popular periodical, "that it is a mortal sin to doubt the falsity of a proposition condemned as unsound."

A *scandalous* proposition is one that although it asserts what is true, nevertheless in a matter of morals is a stumbling block to such as hear it, inasmuch as to some extent it withholds them from good, and incites them to evil. Thus far the Salmanticenses.

De Lugo (De Fide Disp. xx. p. 325.) says, "a temerarious proposition is not infallibly false, neither does the Church define it to be so<sup>3</sup>. . . . There is no proof that a man is obliged to profess that it can never happen that any thing that is rashly asserted should turn out not to be false. And the same may be said of other similar propositions in their degree." He even extends this to the proposition, *proximate to error*.

Ballerini (De Primatu, cap. xv. § 10.) has as follows:—

"Of the censures not all denote falsity or heresy, but temerity, offence to pious ears, equivocation, scandal, &c. which latter notes can fall upon propositions in some sort true *per se*, but which by reason of their temerity, scandal, &c., and especially on account of their equivocation and the false sense in which they may be taken, and have been taken by some, are rightly condemned by the Church. Whence however it in no wise follows, that the real sense, which a sound interpretation may give, and in which they have been accepted by pious and holy men, should be supposed condemned."

The principles laid down by the Bishop of Orleans, in his pamphlet on the encyclical, for the interpretation of theological censures, are very consonant with the doctrine of the above-named theologians. The Bishop admits that a proposition is sometimes condemned for enunciating a new principle "dans un sens trop absolu," i. e. without adequate reference to other counterbalancing principles: or for a particular turn of expression: or for being asserted categorically without sufficient foundation, instead of hypothetically or tentatively: or

<sup>3</sup> Cf. to the same effect, Turrecremata, Summa de Eccles. lib. iv. cap. 11, and Driedo, Appendix, note B.



for its "équivoque," the one sense being true, the other false : or in the idiosyncratic sense of a particular author.

Now I am far from denying that Dr. Ward could bring forward great authorities, Suarez, Viva, Cardenas, &c., in support of his view, that falsity is denoted by all the minor censures ; but I am sure he will not find in those authors any thing like his monstrous assertion—that all who doubt of the falsity of any proposition condemned as unsound, are guilty of mortal sin ;—and even if he could find that they draw this as a conclusion from their theological theory, it would not justify him in making the assertion baldly, in a popular periodical, in the teeth of the opposite authority.

Viva, who goes as far as any body in making all the minor censures denote falsity, and in fact endeavours to reduce propositions "temerarious" and "scandalous," to "erroneous," only says that a person would sin grievously who should *teach* or *defend* any of the censured propositions or *act upon* them (i. e. in a moral matter) with a pertinacious judgment that they are probable and true.

Am I not right in saying that Dr. Ward, not contented with ignoring all authorities but those which make for himself, actually exaggerates the positions of his own authorities ?

According to the definition of a proposition "erroneous," and "proximate to error" given above, they are both of them ultimately reducible to the contradictory of a theological conclusion ; which theological conclusion, as I have argued, is objectively *de fide*. If they were the contradictories of theological conclusions defined by the Church, they would be heretical formally. According therefore to the theory I have been advocating, propositions erroneous and proximate to error are *objectively* heretical. The question then arises, whether the Church by pronouncing a proposition "erroneous" or "proximate to error" defines the theological conclusion of which the censured proposition is the contradictory. I conceive that she does this at least when she uses the censure "erroneous in faith," and that this is that "censure equivalent to heresy,"—inasmuch as it certainly expresses falsity *in materiâ fidei*,—in her application of which the Church is certainly infallible. (Cf. Ballerini and Tanner, as cited above.) As to the censure "proximate to error," it is not more than probably reducible



to "erroneous." De Lugo holds that it does not necessarily involve falsity, and it certainly does not seem to define what is to be believed or condemned *ex Catholico dogmate* with the "expressness and precision" we have seen Ballerini requires for an infallible utterance.

The essential *heresy* of propositions *erroneous in faith* is expressly taught by many Divines.

Cardinal Turrecremata (Sum. de Eccles. lib. iv. par. ii. cap. 8), having defined Catholic verity to be that "quæ ex Divinæ revelationis lumine supernaturali immediate vel mediate est habita, explicitè in propriâ verborum formâ, vel implicitè bonâ et necessariâ consequentiâ" (cap. 10) declares that all propositions are heretical which are opposed to Catholic verity.

Alphonsus de Castro (de Just. Punit. Hæret. lib. i. cap. 3), confesses that he cannot see any real difference between the condemnation as *heretical*, and as *erroneous in faith*.

Bolgeni (Fatti Dommatici, vol. i. cap. iv. nò. 36) advocates the same view. "Or come dice san Tommaso, la fede ha per suo oggetto e le rivelazioni espresse, e le rivelazioni implicite: 'circa utraque potest esse fides,' e l'eresia può darsi circa l'una e l'altra rivelazione 'circa utraque potest esse hæresis.'"

As to the censure *scandalous*, Cardenas, in his *Crisis Theologica*, whilst admitting that a scandalous proposition as such does not involve falsity, nevertheless insists that when the Pope pronounces a proposition to be scandalous, since his judgments have not only certainty but perpetuity, that proposition must be eternally inherently scandalous, and so false.

Now upon this I will merely observe that, if it means that the Pope cannot judge and pronounce on temporary circumstantial scandal, it surely involves a defect in the Holy Father analogous to that which frequently accompanies the phenomenon of longsightedness, viz. of inability to see what is close at hand. Unless it can be proved that the Pope never does pronounce on temporary scandal, we cannot argue from his use of the censure "scandalous" the existence of more than temporary scandal.

In regard to many of the minor censures I confess that I do not see how their precise positives are attainable, nor upon what exactly an absolute interior assent can fall. If it be said that it must fall upon the truth that the censured propo-

sition infallibly merits the censure attached to it, I must say that I do not understand how the certainty we have of this can be more than a practical certainty resolving itself into the judgment that we shall be certainly taking a *dangerous* course in not acting as though the Church was infallible in such censures. I do not see what injury to the pastoral office is involved in the belief that, to use a favourite simile of Dr. Ward's, some blades of wholesome herbage may be interspersed amongst the poisonous weeds of a forbidden pasture, if only the sheep does not presume upon its belief that this is the case, to disregard the injunctions of its shepherd. Although the *schola* seem agreed in condemning, as at least proximate to error, the *denial* that any of the condemned propositions merit the censure which the Church attaches to them; still this is not equivalent to demanding an *absolute interior assent* to the fact that the censured proposition deserves its censure; and supposing De Lugo to be right in his view that the censure "proximate to error" does not involve falsity, even when applied by the Church, and still less when applied by theologians, it would follow, that the proposition "The Church is not infallibly just in her application of certain of the minor censures," though "proximate to error," is not necessarily false, and therefore only our practical acquiescence, or at most our pious presumption in its favour, not our absolute interior assent can be demanded to the justice of the application of such censures?

Until it be authoritatively determined that all the other minor censures are ultimately reducible to the censure erroneous in fide, I do not see how the Pope's infallibility in their application can be pronounced certain, however improbable it may be that he should err. Where the duty of interior (absolute) assent is neither implied in the form of censure, nor expressly stated, we may surely say,

"Nescire velle quæ magister maximus  
Docere non vult, erudita inscitia est."

When once the idea of necessary truth or falsehood is excluded from any decision of the Church, it seems obvious to regard such a decision as falling back into the category of laws, which, though substantially good, i. e. in conformity with the law of nature and the Gospel, the Pope or Church

may possibly issue, as theologians generally allow, “quando non oportet, aut ubi non oportet.” (Cf. Bannez, Append. note D.)

Pallavicini (Hist. Conc. Trident, lib. xv. cap. 18) meets the objection of Sarpi to the right of the Pope, with or without the Index, to proscribe books, thus,—“If any one should object that both in imposing and relaxing these interdicts there has been sometimes error, let him consider that this is common to all states, magistrates, and laws:” again, “If it be objected that excess may be fallen into ‘ex immoderatâ animi affectione,’” (i.e. by the Pope in proscribing a work that may seem to curtail his authority,) “I answer, as I have often answered in a like matter, that this is clearly inevitable in the case of a supreme authority, which is moreover the judge in its own cause, but nevertheless there must be such an authority to prevent endless litigation.”

Dr. Ward has thrown into a more precise and polemical form than in his volume of Essays, his argument for the infallibility of the Church in her application of the minor censures, in his article on Dr. Pusey, in the “Dublin Review” of January, 1867 (p. 90). After taunting his opponents with their unwillingness to meet him, he proceeds in a masterful and lion-taming manner to pin the reluctant but yielding monsters, as he thinks, in a corner, in this wise,—Has not the Church her gift of infallibility in order to maintain the *depositum*? Yes. Can you deny that certain philosophical tenets logically, and certain others practically, lead to heresy? No. Must not the Church have power to expel such errors from the minds of believers, if she is to maintain the *depositum*? Yes. Can she expel such errors unless she can certainly decide which these are? No. Triumphant conclusion:—Then the Church is infallible in all condemnations of such tenets as erroneous and unsound! Howls of baffled rage from the minimizing Catholics.

Whether this little scene be got up for Dr. Pusey’s edification, or merely to get Dr. Ward’s hand in, it is not easy to see.

I confess a reluctance to meddle with this bewildering argument. One imagines one has got to deal with an honest piece of logic, and lo! one is suddenly grappled in the multitudinous arms of Dr. Ward’s Ideal Church. In the early



days of the Ideal, though it might be mischievous, though, like Scott's "White Lady of Avenel," it might play you a shrewd trick in the dark, yet there was something graceful and attractive in it: but now there is something ghastly and repulsive in its pertinacity. It is like fighting with a cuttle-fish. However, I will essay it, premising 1st, that I am not concerned with the conclusion, which I have discussed elsewhere, but with the argument. 2nd. That I have admitted, on theological grounds, the strict infallibility of the Church in pronouncing the censure "erroneous in fide." The argument is our old friend the *à priori* argument, and I maintain that it will prove almost any thing.

Admitting then Dr. Ward's first three assertions, to the effect, that the Church has what infallibility she has, for the maintenance of the *depositum*; and that there are some philosophical doctrines which logically, others which practically, lead to heresy; I will, with Dr. Ward's leave, substitute for the rest, the following:—If the Church cannot expel from the minds of the faithful the tenet, that the Pope and many of the bishops are actuated by ambition and other unworthy motives, which tenet has certainly in many cases led, not logically, God forbid! but practically, to both schism and heresy, she cannot securely guard the *depositum*; but she could only expel such a tenet, by infallibly declaring such a case to be impossible: *therefore* she may infallibly make such a pronouncement. So much for the elasticity of the *à priori* argument.

Of course, the Church has the power of applying, in her legislative capacity, many different remedies to counteract the practical ill effects of various tenets upon faith and morals. But her power of using the particular remedy of infallibly pronouncing an obnoxious tenet to be *false*, must arise from its logical opposition to a truth of the *depositum*, and not from the desirableness of eradicating in the *most* effective manner a present mischief.

I have no intrinsic difficulty as regards the condemnations of the recent Syllabus, when submitted to a theological interpretation such as Mgr. Dupanloup's, in ranking them in all respects with formally condemned propositions. Nevertheless it must be confessed that there are very considerable grounds



for supposing that the Syllabus is nothing more than an index of the principal points in Pius IX.'s Briefs, issued for the convenience of the Bishops at the Pope's command, but not made or formally sanctioned by him; whence it would follow, that the expressions in it have no other force than they possessed in the documents from which they have been respectively taken.

Dr. Ward, however, actually supposes that the recent Syllabus encyclicizes, and so stamps as infallible, not only the particular doctrine it quotes, but also all the other doctrines contained in the original document. What authority he has for so wild an assertion, he does not tell us. He argues (p. 119), that because the Munich Brief is quoted in the Syllabus, not only the passage so quoted, but the whole Brief from which it is quoted is infallible.

#### IV.

It now remains briefly to consider Dr. Ward's treatment of the difficulties of the Galileo case.

(P. 144.) He says, "Paul V. undoubtedly united with the Congregation of the Index in solemnly declaring that Copernicanism is contrary to Scripture." Again (p. 154), "It would seem that the Holy Father commissioned the Inquisition to pursue the matter according to the ordinary course of that tribunal; while he chose the other Congregation (the Index) as the mouth-piece of his own doctrinal deliverance."

After speaking (pp. 155—157), 1st, Of the doctrinal decree of the Inquisition, with which the Pope had no special concern, and which therefore Dr. Ward considers himself at liberty to criticize; secondly, Of the practical resolve of the Inquisition, with the Pope's express sanction, but which was not concerned with doctrine; and, thirdly, Of the disciplinary decree of the Index, also issued with the Pope's sanction, prohibiting certain Copernican works, for attempting to prove Copernicanism "consonant to truth," and "not opposed to Scripture," and which decree asserts, in its preamble, the falsehood and unscripturalness of such doctrine<sup>4</sup>, but whose scope is

<sup>4</sup> The *preambles* of doctrinal, not to say disciplinary, decrees, even Dr. Ward allows to be fallible.

purely disciplinary, he concludes, "Lastly comes the doctrinal decree of the Index, which would seem to have been issued simultaneously with its disciplinary decree: of this, so far as we know, the fullest extant account is to be found in Bellarmine's letter to Galileo."

Now will it be credited, that the only authority in Bellarmine's letter (p. 158), for the existence of any such doctrinal decree of the Index, is a statement to the effect, that, whilst Galileo had not been required to make "any sort of retraction in relation to any of his opinions or of his ideas" . . . "a communication had been made him of a declaration of his Holiness our Sovereign, which declaration was promulgated by the Sacred Congregation of the Index, from the tenor of which it results, that the doctrine attributed to Copernicus . . . is opposed to Holy Scripture, and consequently may not be defended nor held?" Is it not obvious, at least in default of other evidence for the existence of a doctrinal decree, to interpret this as referring to the disciplinary decree of the Index, "the declaration of his Holiness" prohibiting certain books: "from the tenor of which," particularly considering the doctrinal statement in the preamble, Bellarmine, as a theologian, might deduce as highly probable, the real opposition of Copernicanism with Scripture? This is confirmed by the fact, that the writer in the "Rambler" of Jan. 1852, to whom Dr. Ward acknowledges that he is mainly indebted for his information, whilst quoting Bellarmine's letter for another purpose, seems to have had no suspicion of the existence of any such doctrinal decree.

If this be so, the difficulty of the Galileo case, as an objection to the infallibility of the Pope, at once falls to the ground, since there would then be no doctrinal pronouncement, sanctioned by the Pope, against Copernicanism. It is hard at first sight to see, why Dr. Ward is not satisfied with such a solution of the difficulty, or why he should look for a doctrinal pronouncement, which he will have to explain away. However he may have some other authorities, besides Bellarmine, *in petto*, and as I am concerned to consider his theory as it stands, I will assume that he is right, and that the "declaration of his Holiness is," as he calls it, a "doctrinal deliverance."

Dr. Ward declares (p. 129), this not to have been an infallible pronouncement *ex cathedrâ*, because it was not promulgated by the Pope's express command; and argues that it lacked this express order, because it was published, not in the Pope's name, but in that of the Cardinals of the Index: and (p. 161) he urges the view, that doctrinal pronouncements, made by the Pope in the name of the Cardinals, are not infallible, on the authority of Zaccaria: and yet (p. 129) he had quoted Zaccaria, as holding, that, when decrees are published in the name of the Cardinals, but with the knowledge of the Pope and by his special order, they are infallible; and had adopted the opinion as his own. Now is it conceivable, that, what Bellarmine calls "a declaration of His Holiness," and Dr. Ward "the Pope's doctrinal deliverance," should have been published without his special order?

Fromond (apud Ward, p. 160) did not regard the Copernican theory as heretical, in spite of the decree of the Index, and expresses his reasons as follows: "When I consider how circumspect and slow Popes usually are in defining matters of faith *ex cathedrâ*, and that they always issue these decrees in their own and not in other persons' names." Fromond then denies the heresy (synonymous, as I understand him, with infallible falsity) of Copernicanism, really, among other grounds, on the ground which Dr. Ward, in more than one place, wrongly attributes to Zaccaria. Still the issuing in his own name is only given by Fromond, as one among several requisites, slowness, circumspection, &c. He evidently has in view all the formalities attending an infallible pronouncement, and it is pretty evident from his mode of speaking, that a man so anxious not to anticipate authority, would have shrunk from Dr. Ward's whole theological position, i.e. with regard to doctrinal pronouncements, as uncertain.

I cannot but think, that Dr. Ward has confused himself by his efforts to do too much. He wishes to relieve the Pope's infallibility from the charge of the anti-Copernican decrees: but at the same time he wishes to show, that the congregational decrees were a true doctrinal guidance, and demanded the internal assent of contemporary Catholics. He cannot therefore afford to relieve the Pope, by denying the doctrinal



nature of the decrees which he sanctioned : and as he cannot make up his mind to relinquish Zaccaria's extension of the Pope's infallibility to decrees which, though not running in his name, are yet published by his express order, he on the whole forsakes Fromond's tangible test of the Pope's name for the obscure and unpractical test of the Pope's express order.

The difficulty, as I conceive it, that Dr. Ward has got himself into, is this. He has granted that Paul V. condemned Copernicanism as contrary to Scripture. The decree was encyclical, in the sense that it was intended for the guidance of the whole Church. It is unreasonable to suppose that, what Bellarmine calls the Pope's "declaration," was not published by the Pope's express order, although in the Cardinals' names, and so it satisfies Zaccaria's and Dr. Ward's requirement for infallibility. I do not think this admits of a doubt, although, whilst using Zaccaria's authority, Dr. Ward sometimes substitutes Fromond's test of the Pope's name, for Zaccaria's test of the Pope's express order. Even the Gallican theory could not help him here, for the Bishops, at least tacitly, accepted the decree ; there was certainly no episcopal protest against it. There seems to me to be but one course for Dr. Ward, viz., to relinquish Zaccaria, and to adopt the view, which that Divine speaks of, as an opinion, although not the most common, i. e., that the Pope, when issuing decrees, not in his own name, is speaking, not as universal doctor, but as the head of a congregation : which is the view apparently contemplated by Fromond.

The *doctrinal* decree of the Index, if such a decree there be, must be allowed to have been a mistake. If it had contented itself with condemning Copernicanism, as temerarious and scandalous, in the then conditions of science, no fault could have been found with it ; but in pronouncing it "contrary to Scripture," it applied a censure universally accounted equivalent to that of "heretical," and was so far incorrect. Why should Dr. Ward shrink from admitting this ? He has allowed that the Inquisition was wrong in its doctrinal decree, and he has declared that the Pope's infallibility was not committed to the Index. Why should not the latter



congregation have been wrong too? Both equally are Pontifical congregations.

Regarding the decisions of Pontifical congregations, Dr. Ward, whilst allowing that they are not infallible, insists upon the necessity of yielding them an interior assent. The Catholic Copernicans of the day, he says, were bound to believe, that Copernicanism was contrary to Scripture (and therefore false). At the same time, since (p. 145) "scientific truth cannot really be opposed to theological, and the Church could not rightly issue any command, which should prevent a full and searching investigation of the Copernican hypothesis," they were permitted to continue their investigations. But what sort of an internal assent would that be, which could co-exist with the feeling, that, though the Church was right, they must really see, whether she was not wrong. If, on the other hand, their interior assent was firm, and their doubt purely methodical, imagine the shock to the poor orthodox men of science, when they should find the Church wrong after all; either reason or faith must give way.

Pursuing no train of thought at all, eating, drinking, sleeping, praying if you will, we should have a better chance of preserving the ray of intelligence God has given us, than chained to the oar aboard Dr. Ward's galley, which he tells us forsooth is the bark of Peter. In the former case, the mind might be indeed asleep, but at least it would not be worn out by the vain excitement of fruitless toil; it would not have the misery of seeing all its thoughts swallowed up, like oar-prints in the sea, and its every effort even to realize the conditions of its servitude, confused and deadened by Dr. Ward's dogmatic speaking-trumpet. Surely, the Ideal Church, like other Utopias, may at least serve the good end of evoking our gratitude, that God has not left our religious, any more than our political conditions, to our own choosing.

Riccioli (apud Ward, p. 161) says, that, in consequence of the decree of the Index, "Catholics are bound in prudence and obedience, at least so far as not to teach the contrary." This was published under authority; therefore, no interior assent was demanded to the truth of the decree. Bellarmine, as we have seen, gave Galileo a *testamur*, to the effect, that he had not been required to retract any of his opinions or ideas:

whence we may conclude that he was suffered still to entertain them.

Dr. Ward (p. 119) considers it certain, that, since the recent Encyclical and Syllabus, no Catholic is at liberty to hold the opinion that interior assent may be withheld from a doctrinal decree of the Index or Inquisition. This is his argument: "The recent Encyclical and Syllabus make it absolutely certain that the Munich Brief was a dogmatic decision, pronounced *ex cathedrâ*, and consequently infallible: but the Munich Brief rules "that it is necessary, that Catholic men of science should submit themselves to the doctrinal decisions, which are put forth by the Pontifical congregations."

Upon this I remark, 1st, That the Munich Brief says nothing of interior assent, but of submission. 2nd. That there is no ground for presuming that the quotation in the Syllabus, even if that document be infallible, of one proposition has any effect upon the other propositions not so quoted.

Dr. Ward's whole treatment of the Galileo case simply amazes me. He cannot deny that his doctrinal decree of the Index was objectively untrue in affirming Copernicanism to be opposed to Scripture, except by explaining away that censure<sup>5</sup>. He protests, that the Index's doctrinal condemnation of Copernicanism is no exception to the inerrancy of the Pontifical Congregations, which, however, have no divine promise of inerrability; that its doctrine was the one true doctrine or doctrinal guidance under the circumstances; that it was no mistake at all, yet that it was a special mercy, that the Pope's infallibility was not committed to it. He allows,

<sup>5</sup> I say "explaining away," for this censure cannot fairly be explained to mean, merely, contrary to the received interpretation of Scripture. "Opposed to Scripture" is a technical expression, which theologians universally account equivalent to the censure "heretical," and in this sense Fromond evidently takes it, for he says that Copernicanism was condemned as "false, repugnant to Scripture, and heretical." The very idea of a doctrinal decree to define the notorious fact that Copernicanism was contrary to the received interpretation is absurd. Moreover, in the doctrinal *preamble* to the disciplinary decree of the Index, all that Dr. Ward has been able to quote in the shape of a doctrinal pronouncement, and which may naturally be supposed to represent the character of any previous or subsequent doctrinal decree, if there be one, Copernicanism is asserted to be not only "opposed to Scripture," but "false."

that the doctrinal decree of the Inquisition was really a mistake, but still without any prejudice to the inerrancy of the Pontifical Congregations. One is irresistibly reminded of the ingenious Irishman's three pleas for the broken kettle; that he had broken but mended it, that it was broken before he got it, that it was never broken at all.

I should be sorry to think, that I had been actuated, in my strictures on Dr. Ward, by any less worthy motive than has evidently inspired his volume; the vindication of God's Providence in his Church: although it cannot be denied, that we differ very materially in the means to be employed. I feel that Dr. Ward, in attempting to extend the sphere of the Church's infallibility beyond its ascertained limits, is risking the cause of that infallibility altogether: that his Ideal Church is unreal and unhistorical, and has led him to treat in an unreal and even illogical manner historical facts: that in advocating an Ecclesiastical faith, Divine in its certainty, human, or at least not strictly Divine in its motive, he is advocating a paradox, which is not only not generally accepted by theologians, as he implies, but is discountenanced by the majority of them. I have tried to suggest, as far as possible, the sphere of Ecclesiastical infallibility which we, as Catholics, I mean as good Catholics, are bound to accept with the absolute interior assent of Divine faith, and beyond that universal obligation, in the region of theology, I have endeavoured to recommend, on grounds of reason and authority, what I conceive to be the most satisfactory theory of the *de fide quoad objectum*, the possible subject-matter of infallible pronouncements. I do not deny, that, beyond the strict limits of infallibility, there is a wide sphere, in which we owe the Holy Father honour and obedience; and, not to speak of that Divine assurance, that, whatever may be the human infirmity of captain and of crew, the bark of the Church will be ultimately guided "in portum voluntatis suæ," I fully admit that we owe the Pope a practical filial confidence; that, even in matters of detail, in which, as he has been before, so he may be again mistaken, our highest interests will inevitably lie in submission to his guidance and conformity to his suggestions.

Although I have criticized Dr. Ward generally, and although I disagree with so many of his conclusions, I should



be the last to undervalue the dynamic effect of his writings. It is impossible, that he should move any where in the sea of letters, without displacing a considerable amount of water. He has surely done good service in opening with singular, if one-sided, ability many deeply interesting questions, which less vigorous or less conscientious minds would have shrunk from. For some time past, however, he has exercised a sort of religious tyranny over us, as the Dr. Johnson of theological literature, and the very earnestness and unction of his expressions of humility have only served to prostrate us the more completely.

I shall have succeeded in my main object, if I have shown that Dr. Ward has unwarrantably enlarged the bounds of the *obligatio fidei*, by his zealous exaggeration of a theory which itself is not exclusively orthodox. I am convinced that in thus insisting upon clothing his fellow Catholics, as Saul did David, with his own garments, his helmet of brass and his coat of mail, Dr. Ward is forcing upon them an equipment, in which, however it may become himself, the majority of them cannot even walk, still less fight.

Circumstanced as Catholics are in this country, it is impossible, that any thing we say or write on religious topics should not have a controversial bearing. We cannot forget, that our audience is never exclusively Catholic, and that perhaps the majority of our readers are non-Catholics. This surely imposes upon us, as a peculiar obligation, the duty of not venturing any doctrinal statement we are not in a position to prove, or at least, when we do so, of keeping sharply defined the limits between that truth we are commissioned to teach all nations, and the various suggestions of pious belief, even when these are thoroughly healthy and natural. It must be confessed, that sundry of our controversialists, in their fear lest they should fall into any unworthy compromise, whenever they see that a Protestant opponent has got hold of one corner of Catholic truth, instead of lending him a helping hand, immediately take up their position at its extreme opposite, or worse still, on the principle "*contraria contrariis curantur*," too frequently inflict upon a genuine seeker after revealed truth an opinion, orthodox indeed, but not of exclusive orthodoxy: e. g., they will urge upon one who by



study of the Fathers and Church History is gradually arriving at a conviction of the Pope's supremacy, the widest possible extension of Papal infallibility.

I would recommend particularly to Dr. Ward's attention two authors, who speak of the abuse of probable opinions in controversy; and what they say of controversy, will apply in its degree to any religious treatment before a non-Catholic audience. The Wallemburghs' "*de Controv.* lib. vii., *de viâ inveniendi unitatem*," and the English Benedictine, Fr. Cressy, "*Exomologesis*." I take this liberty with the less scruple, recollecting that Dr. Ward, in a recent No. of the "*Dublin Review*," ventured to prescribe a course of reading for one of his antagonists. Both these authors (*vid.* Appendix, note D) protest against the hindrance to conversion, arising from Catholic writers mixing up what is more or less probable with what is certain, and enforcing the two together without sufficient distinction.

There must ever be theological parties in the Church. I suppose a certain amount of friction necessarily accompanies the vital action of every organic body. It is not of theologians on earth, but in heaven, that the Church sings,

"Doctores lucidi, victis erroribus,  
In Deo placidi, puris de fontibus  
Verbum exhauriunt."

The Roman party,—I may fairly separate the *entourage* of the Pope from the person of Christ's Vicar,—are naturally, and rightly jealous of any attempt at relinquishing a single outwork, however remote, between the Church and her enemies, and are the last to be convinced of its untenability. In these trying times, when the Holy See is in such danger and difficulty, the loyalty of its children ought to be more than ordinarily sensitive; and so a Catholic, who conscientiously fails, by however little, of the highest expression as to the Pope's prerogatives, may well afford to accept cheerfully, where he cannot dispel, the suspicions of such as the want of education or leisure has exempted from the responsibility of weighing the force of theological expressions. He can but leave it to events to show, as it shall please God, whether he be loyal or no.

## APPENDIX.

### NOTE A.

#### ON THE EXCLUSIVE CORRELATION OF FIDES DIVINA AND REVELATION.

VIVA, (De Fide Disp. 1. Qu. 3. p. 31.) "Objectum formale fidei est auctoritas Dei revelantis."

(P. 158. Index Prop.) "Objectum materiale fidei est omne et solum a Deo revelatum."

(Disp. 2. Qu. 2. Art. 2. p. 55.) "Ut notat Amicus, Ecclesia non accipit a Deo novas revelationes, sed solum explicat objecta, implicitè olim revelata per prophetas et Christum Dominum, ergo si post definitionem Ecclesiæ sunt de fide et accipienda sunt tanquam a Deo revelata implicitè, ante definitionem Ecclesiæ erant implicitè revelata."

(Disp. 1. Qu. 4. Art. 2. p. 44.) "Proponente Ecclesiâ existentiam revelationis posse a nobis ad arbitrium dici vel actum fidei *humanæ* nixum auctoritati Ecclesiæ tanquam motivo, vel actum fidei *Divinæ* nixum ipsi revelationi, adhibendo auctoritatem Ecclesiæ ut meram conditionem, non ut motivum."

CONINCK, (De Moral. Disp. 12. Dub. 6.) "Ecclesia nullo modo est causa, cur res definita sit de fide, aut a Deo asserta, sed supponit hanc esse talem, antequam eam definiat."

SUAREZ, (De Fide, Disp. 3. Sect. 10. p. 48.) "Assero Ecclesiæ propositionem, seu regulam non spectare ad objectum formale fidei, sed ad peculiarem modum applicationis ejus."

DE LUGO, (De Fide, Disp. 3. Sect. 5. p. 84.) "Non concedo 'nunc credi aliquid explicitè de fide, quod de novo revelatum sit Ecclesiæ, et Apostolis non fuerit revelatum.'"

TANNER, (Tom. iii. De Fide, p. 29.) "Ecclesia definiens aliquid esse de fide, ita ut oppositum sit hæreticum, hoc ipso definit id esse divinitus revelatum, quandoquidem nihil est *de fide certum* nisi quod divinitus revelatum est, cum revelatio Divina sit totalis et adæquata ratio omnis assensûs et certitudinis fidei."

STAPLETON, (Princip. Fidei, Controv. 4. Lib. 8. Cap. 15.) "Successorum Ecclesia in se et per se non cudit, sed tradit ea quæ sunt credenda . . . testis tantum est credendorum, non etiam auctor, ut erant Apostoli; hinc fit, quòd pro ipsius in docendo infallibilitate satis sit, quoad ipsam quidem fidem commendandam et conservandam, quod eam infallibiliter tradat fidelibus, tanquam veritatem a suis majoribus acceptam; aut tanquam gustum quem a fonte suo hausit, præter quem impossibile est ut sapiat cum sit eadem aqua nec immutata. Quoad dubia vero emergentia dissolvenda et latentem veritatem aperiendam; (satis est) quod conclusiones certas et infallibiles faciat; etsi ex argumentis et mediis per se minime interdum validis ad inducendum, tamen ad declarandum idoneis, id faciat."

BOSSUET, (Expos. §. 19.) "L'Eglise professe, qu'elle ne dit rien d'elle-même . . . elle ne fait que suivre et déclarer la révélation divine par la direction intérieure du S. Esprit qui lui est donné pour auteur."

SALMANTICENSES, (Dogm. de Fide, p. 78.) "Etsi omnes concedunt ea quæ Ecclesia definit ut dogmata esse propriè de fide, nullus tamen asserit hoc ideo esse quia Deus per Ecclesiam aliquid denuo nobis revelat, quinimmo hic dicendi modus ab omnibus rejicitur."

(P. 52.) "Ecclesiæ propositio solum se habet, ut applicatio Divinæ auctoritatis, atque ut instrumentum medio quo Deus proponit credenda."

VASQUEZ, (Tom. i. Disp. v. p. 14.) "Ita se habet discursus theologicus respectu particularis theologi, ac generale concilium in ordine ad totam Ecclesiam, eo quod utrique tantum adsit vis declarativa eorum quæ sunt a Deo revelata."

GREG. DE VALENTIA, (De Fide, Disp. 1. Qu. 1. p. 127.) "Illud nunc nego ad Ecclesiam pertinere, asseverare veritatem aliquam fidei, vel proponere revelationem aliquam, quæ fuerit Apostolis penitus ignota. Spectat quidem ad Ecclesiam veritates fidei, quas Apostoli vel cognoverunt vel tradiderunt, prout necessitas postulat, interdum de novo magis explicatè tradere fidelibus, illasque cum infallibili veritate veluti a tenebris eruere."

BRANCATUS CARD. DE LAURÆA, (De Decret. Eccles., Disp. 6. Art. 2. p. 66. seq. apud Rocabert, Tom. xv.) "Formale objectum fidei, seu id propter quod aliquid creditur Deo, est locutio seu manifestatio Dei sive immediata, interne et externe, aut interne tantum, sive mediatè facta.

"Facta humana, et quævis creata futura implicitè tantum et in



genere revelata, quando eveniunt, non sunt objecta fidei respectu omnium fidelium, nisi ab Ecclesiâ proponantur talia, at respectu particularium personarum, qui circumstantias individuales talium prædictorum certissimè cognoscant, sunt objecta fidei obligantque ad sic credendum.

“Quædam revelat Deus explicitè, quædam implicitè; primo modo accidit, quando rem cum determinatis circumstantiis individualibus manifestat, v. g. quòd cælum, terra, &c., creata sunt. Secundo modo, quando manifestat aliquid virtualiter inclusum in alio revelato expressè, et hoc dupliciter accidere potest, vel enim illud includens et inclusum se habent per modum principii et conclusionis, et ita se habent omnia doctrinalia, quæ definit ac definivit Ecclesia ut contenta in doctrinis expressè revelatis, v. g. quòd Filius sit Patri consubstantialis &c. . . . quædam vero sunt implicitè revelata, et virtualiter, tanquam in toto aliquo discreto vel numerico indefinitè manifestato, de quo habemus innumera propemodum exempla in sacrâ Scripturâ, v. g. Beatus vir qui timet Dominum.

“Omnia ad salutem necessaria, et ad regimen Universalis Ecclesiæ jam revelata sunt, sive explicitè, sive implicitè, quia ex Christi promissione Spiritus Sanctus docuit Apostolos omnem veritatem, et quoties Ecclesia aliquid novum proponit credendum vel agendum in totâ Ecclesiâ, illud eruit ex jam revelatis.”

BOLGENI, (*L' Economia*, Cap. i. p. 1.) “Per fede Cristiana si intende l' assenso prestato per motivo della rivelazion di Dio. Un atto di fede Cristiana necessariamente ha questa tendenza: io credo la tale, e tal altra cosa, perchè Dio l' ha rivelata. Togliete questo ‘perchè:’ non è più possibile fare un atto di fede Cristiana.”

## NOTE B.

### ON CONDEMNED PROPOSITIONS.

SALMANTICENSES, (*Dogm. de Fide*, p. 314.) “Nota propositionem, apud theologos seu theologicè damnabilem esse, quæ habet aliquam oppositionem cum doctrinâ fidei, et subinde digna est aliquali censurâ . . . nec semper requiritur ut importet falsitatem, ut minus rectè supponit Suarez . . . Sufficit ergo et requiritur, quod habeat aliquam cum doctrinâ fidei oppositionem, sive hæc

oppositio sit immediata et directa, ut cum aliquid enuntiatur contra doctrinam revelatam, sive sit mediata et indirecta, ut cum aliquid dicitur, quod, licet doctrinæ fidei immediatè et apertè non repugnet, ipsi tamen aliquo modo adversatur, quatenus vel est contra id quod fides mediatè dictat, regulando actûs aliarum virtutum eosque approbando, vel disponit viamque parat ad errorem fidei contrarium; et juxta gradûs majoris vel minoris oppositionis cum fide inventæ sunt variæ notæ, quæ qualitatem propositionum damnabilium designent.

“*Propositio hæretica*, quæ immediatè contrariatur veritati fidei Catholicæ immediatè revelatæ.

“*Propositio erronea*, quæ immediatè et evidenter opponitur veritati a Deo revelatæ mediatè et secundario, sive immediatè et evidenter adversatur conclusioni theologicæ, ut hæc propositio ‘Xtus non est risibilis.’

“Ad præcedentem gradum reducitur propositio *errori proxima*, quæ opponitur veritati deductæ ex principio fidei per consequentiam non evidentem metaphysicè, sed certam moraliter, ut hæc propositio ‘Beata Virgo non est in cælum assumpta in corpore et animâ.’

“*Propositio sapiens hæresim*, quæ, etsi non sit, aut manifestè non appareat hæresis, affert tamen ejus saporem ob convenientiam, saltem in vocibus aut accidentibus, alicui hæresi peculiaribus, ut, post Lutherum, ‘Fides justificat’ quæ secundum se habet sensum Catholicum et reperitur in Sacrà Scripturâ. Aliquæ propositiones ex seipsis saporem hæresis afferunt, talis est illa ‘Ridiculum est circumferre sacramentum per vias publicas.’

“*Male sonans*, quæ habet sensum congruentem fidei, verba autem non congrua, sicut ista ‘In Deo sunt tres essentiæ relativæ.’ . . .

“*Temeraria*, quæ circa doctrinam Fidei, Theologiæ, vel morum aliquid absque sufficiente fundamento affirmat aut negat, ut asserere ‘maternitatem Christi Domini in concreto includere perfectionem physicè infinitam.’

“*Scandalosa*, quæ, licet vera enuntiet, nihilominus in materiâ morum, periculum et occasionem ruinæ audientibus affert, quatenus eos aliquo modo retrahit a bono vel trahit ad malum.”

DE LUGO, (De Fide, Disp. xx. p. 324.) “Propositio temeraria non est omnino infallibiliter falsa, nec eam Ecclesia falsam esse definit. . . . Non enim cogitur (aliquis) evidenter fateri, quòd non posse aliquando contingere, quòd aliquid temerè asseratur, quod tamen re ipsa falsum non sit. Quod idem cum proportionem dici potest de aliis censuris similibus.”

DRIEDO, (De Dogmat. Var. p. 208.) “Quemadmodum autem

quis interdum piè et sanctè credit id, quod falsum est, verum esse: interdum autem quis impiè et temerariè credit verum esse, quod verum est: ita contingit interdum eos, qui falsis sentiis assentiunt, veros esse Catholicos: eos tamen qui veris temerè assentiunt, esse pertinaces."

PALLAVICINI, (Hist. Conc. Trident., Lib. i. Cap. 21.) "Opponit tertiò Suavis: articulos propositos in diplomate, sub incertâ quâdam verborum clausulâ fuisse damnatos, quæ erat respectivè vel tanquam *hæreticos*, vel tanquam *scandalosos*, vel tanquam *piarum aurium offensivos*, vel alia censura, atque adeo ex diplomate contrarium fuisse, quænam esset eorum singulis assignanda censura: atque eo magis hinc patuisse Concilii necessitatem.

"Sed in primis ultima conclusio usque ad eò falsa est, ut potius celebre recensque Concilium Constantiæ habitum hanc ipsam damnandi rationem usurpaverit. Nec ea sane ratio vacat a laude: etenim ut aliquis articulus tanquam fidei dogma statuatur, et summa necessitas urgeat oportet, et exactissimâ trutinâ examinetur, cum hujusmodi declaratio imperet hominum mentibus, rem maxime omnium quam Christiana lex habet arduam, id est, ut res obscuras citra omnem dubitationem credamus. Quapropter Ecclesia, quantum licuit, ab eo semper abstinuit. Jam vero quia multæ doctrinæ homines inclinant in hæresim aliaque infligunt incommoda, par est eas e *linguis* ac *paginis* relegare: atque ad id necesse non est, ut illa certo Dei verbis repugnent; satis est si aut gravia exstent indicia hujus repugnantiae, eo quod adversentur seu communi scholæ consensui, seu sanctorum Patrum auctoritati, aut deprehendantur ut semina operum quæ officiant Christianæ reipublicæ; ac proinde mereantur aliquam ex supra memoratis censuris, quæcunque tandem ea sit. Similiter, ut ab aliquo oppido excludatur advena, non semper est opus ut peste correptus, aut perduellis in aperto sit; sufficit pestilentiae aut perduellionis suspicio. Non igitur Pontifex habuit in animo per hujusmodi diploma dubitationem omnem tollere; (quibus dubitationibus libitum est Deo oppletam esse penè omnem hujus vitæ scientiam, ac potissime Theologiam, quippe cui obscuriora obversantur themata, altiusque nostram intelligentiam supergressa); solum illi consilium fuit, ut certi tantum haberemus, quantum satis erat; nimirum declaravit, eas omnes propositiones perniciosas esse, si tradantur; periculosas, si credantur."

BALLERINI, (De Primatu, Cap. xv. § 10.) "Porro inter censuras non omnes falsitatem aut hæresim notare solent, sed temeritatem, piarum aurium offensionem, æquivocationem, scandalum vel cap-



tiosum sensum &c., quæ notæ cadere possunt in propositiones aliquo sensu veras per se, sed quæ ob temeritatem, offensionem piarum aurium, scandalum, ac præsertim ob æquivocationem ac falsum sensum, in quem trahi possunt ac tracti fuerunt a quibusdam, jure ab Ecclesiâ damnantur, ut ne idcirco verus sensus, quem sanâ interpretatione habere queunt, et in quo a viris piis sanctisque fuerint acceptæ, damnatus credatur.”

THE BISHOP OF ORLEANS, (La Convention et l'Encyclique, p. 101.) “ C'est une règle élémentaire d'interprétation, que la condamnation d'une proposition réprouvée comme fausse, erronée et même hérétique, n'implique pas nécessairement l'affirmation de sa contraire, qui pourrait être souvent une autre erreur, mais seulement de sa contradictoire.”

(P. 102.) “ C'est une autre règle, non moins élémentaire d'interprétation, qu'il faut regarder si la proposition condamnée est universelle et absolue; car, alors, il peut souvent arriver qu'une telle proposition ne soit frappée qu'à cause de son universalité et de son sens trop absolu.”

(P. 105.) “ Autres règles encore : Dans l'interprétation des propositions condamnées, il faut remarquer tous les termes, toutes les plus légères nuances; car la vue d'une proposition ne tient souvent qu'à cela, à une nuance, à un mot, qui seul fait l'erreur. Il faut distinguer les propositions absolues, et les propositions relatives; car, ce qui pourrait être admissible en hypothèse sera souvent faux en thèse. Il y a de plus des propositions équivoques, dangereuses, qui peuvent n'être condamnées qu'à cause de l'équivoque même et du sens mauvais auquel elles donnent lieu, quoiqu'elles puissent avoir aussi un sens bon. Enfin, il y a des propositions,—et le Syllabus en renferme plusieurs,—qui ne sont condamnées que dans le sens de leurs auteurs, et non dans le sens absolu des mots séparés du contexte.”

## NOTE C.

### THE SPHERE OF ECCLESIASTICAL INFALLIBILITY.

SUAREZ, (De Fide, Disp. v. Sect. 8. p. 86.) “ Potestas Pontificis plura membra complectitur ad varias materias pertinentia, habet enim supremam potestatem jurisdictionis in foro sacramentali, habet deinde supremam jurisdictionem in externo foro spirituali et Ecclesiastico. . . . Solum ergo superest dicendum de potestate definiendi, seu docendi Ecclesiam cum infallibilitate. . . .

Veritas Catholica est, Pontificem definientem ex Cathedrâ esse regulam fidei, quæ errare non potest, quando aliquid authenticè proponit universæ Ecclesiæ, tanquam de fide credendum.”

SALMANTICENSES, (Dogm. de Rom. Pont. p. 181.) “Pontifex ad duo obsectorum genera comparari valet: primò ad res fidei, ad bonos Ecclesiæ mores, aliaque hujusmodi, quæ pertinent ad communem ovium sibi creditarum salutem: secundò ad alia quæ vel purè philosophica et naturalia sunt, vel spectant ad negotiorum factum, vel, licet aliquo modo res fidei concernant, ad ejus tamen consistentiam, vel fidelium salutem non pertinent . . . dubitant auctores . . . an Pontifex possit absolutè errare circa objecta secundi generis, quia Pontifices contraria aliquando senserunt et tradiderunt, ergo aliquis eorum tenuit falsum, saltem ut Doctor particularis, vel in rebus quæ non sunt *de substantiâ fidei*, vel pro quibus decernendis non præmisit debitam diligentiam.”

TANNER, (Tom. iii. de Fide, p. 267.) “Pontifex, etiam ut pontifex, errare potest, in particularibus quæstionibus facti dijudicandis, v. g. an hic vel ille Episcopus hujus vel illius criminis reus, et ideo deponendus. Ita etiam sentiunt omnes Catholici.” (Cf. Bellarmine de Rom. Pont. Lib. iv. Cap. 2.)

(P. 274.) “Si in materiâ fidei Pontifex aliquod decretum edat, ut Pastor Ecclesiæ, diligenter ex circumstantiis, occasione videlicet scribendi, quæstione propositâ, verbis decreti, &c., dijudicandum erit, quidnam directè docere, seu determinare intendat Pontifex . . . In ipsâ vero directâ responsione ponderanda sunt verba: nam si apertè dicat, id esse dogma fidei, aut contrarium repugnare Scripturæ, seu Apostolicæ traditioni, vel esse hæreticum, seu in fide erroneum aut alioqui utatur verbis præceptivis, quibus ab universâ Ecclesiâ ita sentiendum mandet: ac præcipuè si anathemate aliter credentes seu sentientes feriat, manifestum signum est, Pontificem id ipsum definire; secus si tantum prohibeat contrarium doceri, etiam sub excommunicatione; id enim universim non sufficit ad exploratam definitionem fidei; et eadem ratio est quotiescunque ex verbis et circumstantiis colligi potest eum tantum privatum ferre iudicium, aut proponere aliquid solum ut doctrinam probabiliorem. In quâ re dejudicandâ multum valet tum virorum sapientum iudicium, tum fidelium sensus et consensus.”

(P. 275.) “Denique circa ipsum formale decretum definitionis diligenter advertendum est, an id legitimè et sufficienter fuerit promulgatum, atque etiam an tempus ejusdem obligationis præfixum fuerit elapsum, priusquam id refrigeretur seu retractaretur.”

BALLERINI, (De Primatu, Cap. 15. § 6.) “Ea igitur fides, seu doctrina fidei, quæ in controversiis fidei ab ipsis Pontificibus ita proponitur, ut fratres et fideles omnes confirmant in fide, et unitatem ejusdem fidei exigant atque conservent in Ecclesiâ Catholicâ, illa est cui inerrantiæ privilegium ex promissis Christi est vindicandum. Solas itaque fidei definitiones id respicit a summis Pontificibus Ecclesiæ propositas contra insurgentes dissensiones et errores in materiâ fidei; non autem opiniones, quibus etsi aliquid statuunt, nihil tamen decernunt credendum ex Catholicâ fide, nihilque damnant tanquam alienum ab eâdem.”

(Appendix de Infallibilitate.) “Cum enim auctoritas Romanis Pontificibus tributa sit ad custodiendam in dissidiis unitatem fidei, unitas vero fidei in dissidiis seu controversiis circa fidem, ab Ecclesiæ præpositis non aliâ ratione vindicetur nisi expressè definiendo, quid vel credendum vel damnandum sit ex Catholico dogmate; idque ita expressè atque præcisè, ut obligatio assentiendi, unitatisque præstandæ ex ipsis verborum formulis innotescat; quidquid extra hujusmodi definitionum terminis est, nec satis exprimit debitum unitatis, sicut non refertur ad finem primatûs, ita nec ex eâ auctoritate editum dici potest, cui infallibilitatis prærogativa tribuenda sit.”

BOLGENI, (L' Economia, Cap. i. p. 75.) “A S. Pietro e ai successori di lui tocca per istituzione di Gesù Christo a confermar nella fede i fratelli, e vale a dire a togliere tutti i dubbii, e a sopire le controversie che insorgono nelle materie dommatiche, attestando colla autorità ricevuta per le orazioni di Gesu Christo, che il tale e tal altro punto è veramente rivelato da Dio. Questo è quel testimonio irrefragabile, al quale non è licito contradire senza peccato contro la fede: questo è quel fondamento sul quale è piantato l'edifizio della chiesa.”

STAPLETON, (Princip. Fidei Controv. 4. Lib. 8. Cap. 15.) “Docendi infallibilitas in causâ fidei Ecclesiæ data, (intelligendo per Ecclesiam, Apostolorum successores, id est, vel totam seriem succedentium Episcoporum, vel consensum Patrum, vel ipsa Concilia, vel Summos Pontifices) tantummodo in illis fidei dogmatibus infallibiliter definiendis, et fideli populo certâ veritate tradendis, locum habet, quæ vel in controversiam vocantur, vel alioqui ad publicam Ecclesiæ fidem necessariò pertinent. Sensus hujus assertionis est, quando de iis quæstionibus, quæ vel non necessariò ad fidem pertinent, sed salvâ fidei compage variè a variis intelligi possunt, vel non ad publicum aliquod et commune dogma explicandum, (quod vel omnes fideles explicitè credere debent vel in



publico Religionis usu versatur, vel saltem majores explicitè, populus autem implicitè in majorum fide) sed ad privatam alicujus vel infirmi fidem instruendam, vel superbi curiositatem explendam, vel denique ad ea explicanda spectant, quæ potius *appendices fidei* sunt, quam ad ejus substantiam pertinentia: quando de hujusmodi (inquam) quæstionibus vel *consultitur*, vel obiter disputat Ecclesia, aberrare aliquando poterit, vel asserendo, vel etiam concludendo, absque eo quod hæc promissa a Christo Ecclesiæ infallibilitas violata propterea fuerit. In disputationibus autem, quæ circa quæstiones ad dogma fidei publicum necessariò pertinentes versantur, vel alioqui in controversiam apertè vocantur, consulta Ecclesia concludendo quidem et asserendo nunquam errat. In mediis autem ipsis et argumentis, hallucinari et aberrare poterit, salvâ tamen promissâ Ecclesiæ eâ, quam diximus, docendi infallibilitate.”

DRIEDO, (De Dogmat. Var., Lib. iv. p. 211. et seq.) “ Nos autem immorantes his, quæ veneranda nobis tradidit antiquitas, credimus omnem veritatem esse de necessitate fidei, quæ vel in Scripturis sacris est expressa, vel demonstratur ex necessitate consequi ex his quæ in iisdem Scripturis sunt tradita, vel definita traditione universalis Ecclesiæ. Ex necessitate consequitur, Christum habuisse pulmonem, cerebrum, nervos et venas, quæ tamen in Scripturis non reperimus expressa. Et quia jam multa sunt ex sacris Scripturis elucidata, quæ olim, sub ipsis fidei Christianæ rudimentis, nondum erant ex illis declarata, idcirco nunc multa reputantur hæretica, de quibus tunc nondum ex Scripturis sacris elucidatis, licebat olim aut dubitare aut in utramque partem disputare. Ex definitione Ecclesiæ Apostolicæ credere oportet Beatam Mariam permansisse Virginem post partum, quod tamen ex Scripturis sacris non sequitur necessariò. Ad pietatem fidei pertinet veritas ad quam ut non temerè rejiciatur, sed credatur, pia affectio fidei Christianæ consultâ ratione movet. Nam pietas fidei, quemadmodum jam patuit, est affectio pia, quâ, circumspectâ ratione, fides Christiana adjuvatur, id est, nutritur, fovetur, roboratur: et idcirco ad pietatem fidei attinet, quicquid aptum est fovere fidem, et quod unumquemque pie affectum ad Christianam fidem, ratione prudenter considerante verisimilia aut probabilia argumenta, non solum oportet non contemnere, sed et decet potius credere sic esse aut gestum, aut factum, quamvis neque Scripturis sacris, neque determinatione Ecclesiæ, aut generalis Concilii sit definitum. Et hujus generis sunt sanctorum martyrum, &c., vitæ, miracula, &c. . . . quæ Ecclesia proponit tanquam pro-

babilia, verisimilia. Veritas omnino impertinens fidei est, quæ neque ex necessitate, neque ex probabili argumento consequitur ex his, quæ sunt vel in Scripturis sacris, vel in Universalis Ecclesiæ aut Apostolorum definitionibus expressa. Falsitas contraria alicui sententiæ primi generis est hæresis. Falsitas contraria alicui sententiæ secundi generis de hæresi suspecta est."

PALLAVICINI, (Hist. Conc. Trident., Lib. xv. Cap. 18.) "Quod si quis objectaret, in iis interdictis tum indicendis, tum relaxandis, interdum errari, apud se reputet, id esse commune cuivis Rei-publicæ, cunctis magistratibus, legibus universis. . . .

"Quod si objiciatur iterum, posse nonnunquam ex immoderatâ animi affectione in hoc excedi" (Papâ, in damnandis libris sibi aliquo modo infestis) "idem repeto, quod sæpe in re simili respondi, periculum hujusmodi esse commune, planeque inevitabile cuilibet supremæ potestati, quæ præterea in causâ propriâ judex sit: et tamen necesse est hujusmodi potestatem exstare; aliter inter eos qui præsumunt nunquam ad summum perveniretur, sed proceditur ad infinitum."

BANNEZ, (De Fide, Qu. 1. Art. 10.) "Quando summus Pontifex, aut Ecclesia, in rebus gravioribus et ad Christianos mores formandos conducentibus, toti populo fidei leges statuit, non potest ita errare, ut aliquid Evangelio aut legi naturali contrarium præcipiat. Non enim asserimus, quòd omnes hujusmodi leges sunt necessariae aut secundum prudentiam latæ. Nam interdum fortassis summi Pontifices plures quam oporteat secundum prudentiam leges multiplicant, vel quando non oportet, aut ubi non oportet."

## NOTE D.

### GREGORY XVI. ON PAPAL INFALLIBILITY.

("Il Triompho della Santa Sedia di Mauro Capellari" traduit par l'Abbé Jammes. Tom. ii. de l'Infaillibilité du Pape, Cap. 24. p. 219.) "Et si, dans l'exercice de son autorité, il peut oublier qu'il est Pape quand il n'est pas question d'un point de doctrine, pourquoy ne pourra-t-il pas l'oublier aussi, quand il s'agira d'une question susceptible d'être indirectement ramenée à un principe dogmatique?"

(P. 220.) "Ainsi quand le Pape n'invoque pas toute son autorité, quand il ne prétend pas représenter l'Eglise Catholique comme son chef suprême et comme le juge de la foi, il n'ouvre pas,

si je puis parler de la sorte, à son esprit la porte par laquelle seule peuvent lui arriver les illuminations célestes.”

(P. 221.) “ Concluons que lorsque le Pape n’agit pas et ne commande pas comme chef suprême, il ne parle pas non plus comme juge infaillible, quand même il aurait été consulté de diverses parties du monde Catholique, quand même il aurait examiné la question avec la plus grande attention, quand même il répondrait et déciderait.”

(P. 222.) “ Peu importe même que ceux qui le consulte l’interpellent en sa qualité de juge suprême de l’Eglise, et nous pouvons le supposer ; car c’est du Pape, et non des consultants, que dépend l’usage de sa primauté : cela ne prouve que la persuasion où ils sont, qu’il est infaillible.”

(P. 223 et seq.) “ Il faut qu’il y ait des notes claires et non douteuses auxquelles on puisse reconnaître les cas où le Pape prononce solennellement, c’est à dire *ex cathedrâ*, et ceux où les décisions n’ont pas ce caractère. . . . Or ces notes sont ou intrinsèques, ou extrinsèques ; les unes sont propres aux définitions mêmes, les autres dépendent de la coutume de l’Eglise.” “ Intrinsèques : 1. Le point défini par le Pape doit appartenir à la foi.” “ 2. Son jugement doit annoncer que ces propres pensées sont elles-mêmes bien fixées et arrêtées sur ce point.” “ 3. Il doit faire connaître sa décision à l’Eglise.” “ 4. Il doit l’adresser à l’Eglise *elle-même*.” “ 5. Il faut que les termes dans lesquels la définition est conçue montrent dans le Pape l’intention de commander *absolument*, et en vertu de sa suprême autorité, *l’acte de foi* sur cet article *déterminé*.” “ Extrinsèques : . . Formules établies et déterminées par un usage constant de l’Eglise et des Papes, pour faire connaître d’une manière précise à toute la Chrétienté les jugements suprêmes et définitifs, et la peine conséquemment encourue par les réfractaires. Si le Pape omet cette formule, sans indiquer suffisamment que, malgré cette omission il veut définir en sa qualité de souverain Pontife et de juge de la foi, il faut en conclure qu’il n’a pas prononcé jugement en cette qualité, parcequ’il doit s’accommoder à *l’intelligence universelle*. La principale de ces formalités consiste à qualifier d’hérétique la doctrine contraire, ou à fulminer l’anathème contre ceux qui la professerait dans la suite. On ne devra pas donc regarder comme définitifs les jugements du Pape où ne se trouve pas cette formule ou quelque chose d’équivalent, ni croire qu’il est entendu et voulu, en les rendant, exercer sa primauté d’autorité.”

(P. 226.) “ Ce serait maintenant aux adversaires à me présenter



quelque décret qui aurait été revêtu de tous ces caractères, et qui cependant renfermerait une décision formelle contre la foi, ou déclarerait le Pape faillible, ou aurait été expressément révoqué par ses successeurs."

## NOTE E.

## ABUSE OF PROBABLE OPINIONS IN CONTROVERSY.

CRESSY, (*Exomologesis*, p. 70. seq.) "I am certain I had been much sooner a Catholique if I had thought . . . that the beliefs of the Church's doctrines nakedly as she proposeth them, and in the latitude allowed by her, had been sufficient to have gained that title. But I took those to be the necessary doctrines of the Catholique Church, which were only the private opinions and expressions of particular Doctors."

"How few among them" (Catholique Controversists) "propose the points to be disputed between them and the Protestants in the language of the Church! Besides how few among them are there who in disputing will allow that latitude which the Church apparently does! There is scarce any point of controverſie, which is not severally interpreted, straitened or enlarged by severall Catholiques of severall orders and education; and most of them in confuting the Protestants seem very earnest, and make it almost their whole designe to impose their particular interpretations and expressions for Catholique doctrines, but with very little or no success. . . . The truth is, by these means, disputations are endless, Catholiques themselves affording answers and objections to Protestants against Catholiques. Whereas if particular Controvertists were as indulgent as the Church is, and would be content to thinke that the termes wherein Shee expressed her minde were the most proper, their adversaries would quickly be silenced, controversies abated, and by God's assistance union in a short time happily restored."

(Appendix, p. 48). "I perceived that in the depth and center of my spirit, I was really though unknown to myself, a very Catholike before I was Catholique: for all the necessary declared doctrines of the Catholique religion, (as they are expressed in the language of the Church) I found I had never rejected; and as for those points, which I could not digest, (and for which I had been averted from the Church) I found that they were particular dogmes either of some popular controvertists or schoolmen, or

affixed to certain orders and as freely renounced from the notion of necessary Catholique doctrine by other unsuspected Catholics, as they had been by myself."

(P. 486.) "I cannot but impute the unsuccessfulness in such disputes, and the paucity of converts, to such a way of managing controversies, when Catholics shew what a number of doctrines they are able to maintain more than is necessary, and more than it concerns Protestants to hear of."

FRATRES DE WALLENBURGH, (Controv. de Viâ Inveniendi Unitatem. Cap. iv.) "Sunt in Catholicis, qui non satis distinguunt dogmata verè Catholica et universaliter credenda, a placitis scholarum salvâ unitate Catholicâ controversis, terminos moderationis prætergrediuntur . . . quid hoc est nisi temerario ausu jus Universalis Ecclesiæ invadere? . . . Si turpe est advocato, probabilia tantum argumenta adducere, vel concludere quod parti adversæ non officit: quanto gravius est, si post operosam disputationem, illud contra Protestantes concludit quod contra illos non est controversum? Quod autem inter doctores Catholicos utramque in partem disputatur, non est contra illos propriè controversum, cum licite possunt huic aut illi sententiæ accedere, salvâ fide et unitate Catholicâ. Atque hinc patet non esse moderati Catholici (ubi agitur de quæstione inter doctores Catholicos controversâ) invidiam movere in sententiam contrariam, quòd ea sustineatur a Protestantibus, aut aliis schismaticis, quasi semper tutius sit quam longissimè ab eorum placitis recedere aut potius fugere."

(Cap. vi.) "Etenim viam redeundi reddi difficiliorem errantibus, si sententias in Ecclesiâ Catholicâ controversas adversus Protestantes defendamus, aut in iis oppugnemus, vel ex eo constat, quòd rari sint inter Protestantes, qui doctrinas Ecclesiæ Catholicæ a controversis in Ecclesiâ Catholicâ sententiis nôrunt distinguere, putantes illud totum esse fide Catholicâ credendum, quod contra Protestantes defendunt Catholici, illud totum esse deserendum, quod in Protestantibus reprehendunt Catholici. Unde fit, ut, multitudinem controversiarum perpendentes, sæpe non videant modum emergendi, et sententiam probabiliorem a Doctore Catholico tractatam frequenter admittant difficilius, quam dogma Catholicum solidè stabilitum."

THE END.





